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FORMALISM AND FAIRNESS: MATTHEW
DEADY AND FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAW
IN THE EARLY WEST
Ralph James Mooney*
Security and certainty of title to real property are among the most impor-
tant objects of the law in any civilized community.
Deady in Lownsdale v. City of Portland'
America's vast and rich public domain contributed profoundly to
the development of its nineteenth-century economy, society, and imag-
ination. Federal policies distributing that incomparable treasure has-
tened settlement of communities from the Appalachians to the Pacific,
rewarded three generations of military veterans, promoted internal
improvements ranging from local turnpikes to transcontinental rail-
roads, and helped finance countless public buildings, public schools,
and land-grant colleges.2 At a deeper level, the heralded new Eden in
a remote West represented for Americans everywhere the hope of new,
more noble beginnings and served as a metaphor for their young
nation's unique potential in human history.3
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon. A faculty summer research award aided
materially in the preparation of this article, as did Douglas MacCourt's able and tireless research
assistance. Copyright Ralph James Mooney 1988.
1. 15 F. Cas. 1036, 1039 (D. Or. 1861) (No. 8579); see infra text accompanying note 65.
2. On federal public land policies generally, see T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ITS
HISTORY WITH STATISTICS (1884); P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT
(1968); B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1924); E. PEFFER, THE
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951); R. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, 1776-1936 (1942); P. TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM, 1785-1820 (1910).
Worthwhile collections of recent, more specialized scholarship include P. GATES, LANDLORDS
AND TENANTS ON THE PRAIRIE FRONTIER (1973) [hereinafter P. GATES, LANDLORDS AND
TENANTS]; THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT (D. Ellis ed. 1969); PUBLIC LAND
POLICIES: MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL (P. Gates ed. 1979); THE PUBLIC LANDS:'STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (V. Carstensen ed. 1963)[hereinafter THE PUBLIC
LANDS]. On the singular contributions of Paul Gates to the field, see Scheiber, The Economic
Historian as Realist and as Keeper of Democratic Ideals: Paul Wallace Gates's Studies of
American Land Policy, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 585 (1980).
3. The "myth of the garden" has always pulled powerfully on the American imagination.
Hector St. John de Crevecoeur and Thomas Jefferson were among the first to proclaim it,
celebrating an egalitarian republic of virtuous yeomen. See, eg., J. CREVECOEUR, LETTERS
FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 35-84 (1957 ed.); T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 818, 918 (M.
Peterson ed. 1984). See generally H. SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL
AND MYTH 123-32 (1950); Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 657 (1946).
In the next generation, Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman continued the agrarian
idealist tradition, associating it more explicitly with westward migration. E.g., THE PORTABLE
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The nineteenth-century story of the American public domain also
helps illuminate both the noble and the notorious in our collective
past. Many enterprising, courageous Americans journeyed westward
to settle new lands for God, country, and family.4 To their leading
interpreter, those journeys in the aggregate provided much of
America's "distinctive and valuable ... contribution to the history of
the human spirit," a frontier blend of "individualism, economic equal-
ity, freedom to rise, [and] democracy."' On the other hand, fortunes
large and small often accompanied transfers of public land to private
THOREAU 603-04 (C. Bode ed. 1976) ("Eastward I go only by force; but westward I go free....
I must walk toward Oregon, and not toward Europe."); W. WHITMAN, COMPLETE POETRY AND
COLLECTED PROSE 1336 (J. Kaplan eq. 1982) ("With Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Oregon ... there
is being fused a determined character,... strong, limber, just, open-mouthed, American-blooded,
full of pride, full of ease, of passionate friendliness .. "). See generally J. KAPLAN, WALT
WHITMAN: A LIFE 124-45 (1980); S. PAUL, THE SHORES OF AMERICA: THOREAU'S INWARD
EXPLORATION 412-17 (1958).
By midcentury, many began to herald the vacant West as a "safety valve" against industrial
oppression and to invoke the agrarian pioneer as a powerful antislavery image. Horace Greeley
repeatedly advised his New York Tribune reader to "Go West," see, e.g., Van Zandt, Horace
Greeley, Agrarian Exponent of American Idealism, 13 RURAL Soc. 411 (1948), and as late as
1860 the Republican campaign for a "fee-simple empire" touched the "deepest levels of
American experience." H. SMITH, supra, at 170. See generally E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN (1970); Danhof, Farm-Making Costs and the "Safety Valve": 1850-1860, 49
J. POL. ECON. 317 (1941).
4. By 1880, there existed nearly two million farms in the public land states. P. GATES,
LANDLORDS AND TENANTS, supra note 2, at 770. On pioneer motives for journeying west, see J.
UNRUH, JR., THE PLAINS ACROSS 58-82 (1979) (religious or patriotic missionary work;
economic, social, or political opportunity; lure of "new and fabled lands"; escape from the law,
bankruptcy, slave society, or soured romance; even "better fishing"); see also M. JACOBS,
WINNING OREGON 34-65 (1938); Johansen, A Working Hypothesis for the Study of Migrations,
36 PAC. HIST. REV. 1 (1967); Minto, Antecedents of the Oregon Pioneers and the Light These
Throw on Their Motives, 5 OR. HIST. Q. 38 (1904). For firsthand accounts of life on the overland
trail, see, e.g., F. LOCKLEY, THE LOCKLEY FILES: CONVERSATIONS WITH PIONEER WOMEN
(M. Helms ed. 1981); L. SCHLISSEL, WOMEN'S DIARIES OF THE WESTWARD JOURNEY (1982);
WE'LL ALL Go HOME IN THE SPRING (R. Bennett ed. 1984). For an imaginative study of legal
baggage taken on the trail, see J. REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980).
5. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 259 (1962 ed.) In 1893 Frederick
Jackson Turner abandoned conventional wisdom emphasizing American continuity with Europe,
or sectional conflict, to announce his provocative thesis: "The existence of an area of free land, its
continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American
development." Id. at 1. Ironically, by 1893 the rise of industrial capitalism and land monopoly
had all but shattered the myth of the garden underlying Turner's thesis. See, e.g., H. GEORGE,
PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1955). Still, the thesis revolutionized American historiography and
continues even today to set the agenda for many historians of the American West. See generally
R. BILLINGTON, FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER (1973); THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT (D. Ellis ed. 1969); HISTORIANS AND THE AMERICAN WEST (M. Malone ed.
1983); R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 3-164 (1968); H. SMITH, supra note 3,
at 250-60.
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ownership. Inevitably, therefore, the history of those transfers also fea-
tured widespread avarice, fraud, official misconduct, and lawlessness. 6
Federal law dominated this important story. By 1880 Congress
had passed nearly 3000 statutes granting or regulating parts of the
public domain.7 Administrative and judicial case loads increased cor-
respondingly, as many thousands of claims had to be verified and
recorded and growing numbers of disputes adjudicated.' This article
recalls an early far-west chapter of the story, a remarkable series of
decisions by Oregon federal district Judge Matthew P. Deady 9 inter-
preting the cornerstone of Pacific Northwest public land law, the 1850
Oregon Donation Act."0 Although Deady decided other public land
6, See, e.g., S. PUTER, LOOTERS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1907); Appleman, Timber Empire
from the Public Domain, 26 Miss. VALLEY HisT. REV. 193 (1939); Ellis, The Forfeiture of
Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894, 33 MISS. VALLEY HIsT. REv. 27 (1946); Gates, The Role of
the Land Speculator in Western Development, in THE PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 2, at 349-67;
Messing, Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials, 1903-1910, 35
PAC. HisT. REV. 35 (1966).
7. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW xx (1981);
P. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS, supra note 2, at xi. Early landmarks of federal public
land legislation include the 1785 Land Ordinance authorizing public-domain surveys and auction
sales, see DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123-24 (H. Commager ed. 1943); the
Preemption Act, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (1841), establishing procedures for auctionless sales of 160
acres to actual settlers; and the Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), authorizing outright
grants of 160 acres to homesteaders after five years residence and cultivation. Other important,
more specialized statutes include the Mining Act, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872); the Timber Culture
Act, ch 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873); the Desert Lands Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877); and the
Timber and Stone Act, ch. 76, 20 Stat. 46 (1878). See generally P. GATES, LANDLORDS'AND
TENANTS, supra note 2; B. HIBBARD, supra note 2; R. ROBBINS, supra note 2.
8. On administration, see M. CONOVER, THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE: ITS HISTORY,
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION (1923); M. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE
SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS 1789-1837 (1968);
Anderson, The Board of Equitable Adjudication, 1846-1930, 29 AGRIC. HIsT. 65 (1955). There
exists no general study of public land litigation. For reports on two notorious episodes, both
arising in Oregon after Deady's death, see Ellis, The Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant,
1866-1945, 39 PAC. N.Q. 253 (1948); Messing, supra note 6.
9. On Deady, see infra text accompanying notes 40-48; see also H. BANCROFT, History of the
Life of Matthew P. Deady: A Character Study, in CHRONICLES OF THE BUILDERS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 603-53 (1890) [hereinafter H. BANCROFT]; THE DIARY OF JUDGE
MATTHEW P. DEADY 1871-1892: PHARISEE AMONG PHILISTINES (M. Clark, Jr. ed. 1975)
[hereinafter PHARISEE]; Mooney, Matthew Deady and the Federal Judicial Response to Racism in
the Early West, 63 OR. L. REV. 561, 577-84 (1984); P. Overmeyer, The Oregon Justinian (1939)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Minn.).
10. Ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850). See infra text accompanying notes 14-32. For descriptions of
Oregon-related federal public land statutes, see CHAIRMAN OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE DISPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN
OREGON (Comm. Print 1960) (written by J. O'Callaghan) [hereinafter O'Callaghan]. On the
Donation Act particularly, see Bergquist, The Oregon Donation Act and the National Land
Policy, 58 OR. HIsT. Q. 17 (1957); Chused, The Oregon Donation Act of 1850 and Nineteenth
Century Federal Married Women's Property Law, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 44 (1984); H. Head, The
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law questions as well,'" it is his Donation Act decisions helping to
determine ownership of the Portland land claim which reveal most
clearly both the institutional and the biographical significance of his
work in this field.
The Portland land disputes were of utmost importance to the com-
munity and exceptionally difficult to resolve. They often required
Deady to reconstruct breathtakingly complex fact patterns, then inter-
pret and apply an opaque federal statute overlaid with ancient com-
mon-law property doctrines. Worse, they forced him repeatedly to
confront, under intense public scrutiny, the abiding judicial dilemma:
how to reconcile the need for clear, general rules of uniform, predict-
able application with the equally compelling need for particular results
consistent with individual and community conscience. Deady strug-
gled with this dilemma in the Portland cases, trying simultaneously to
promote certainty of land title and common-law conveyancing princi-
ples and to protect good-faith, though mistaken, purchasers who lived
and worked on the disputed parcels. His choice frequently was
between "legal title" and "equitable title," or, even more generally,
between formalism and fairness.'"
Oregon Donation Acts: Background, Development and Application (1969) (M.A. thesis, Univ.
of Or.).
11. E.g., McConnaughy v. Pennoyer, 43 F. 196, aff'd, 43 F. 339, aff'd, 140 U.S. 1 (1890) (in
suit against state land board, permissible under 11 th Amendment, board enjoined from declaring
plaintiff's patent certificates void; see generally C. Minton, Have We Got Some Land For You:
Oregon Supreme Court Interpretations of Federal and State Swampland Legislation (Dec. 21,
1985) (unpublished) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review)); United States v. Willamette
Valley & Cascade Mountain Wagon Rd. Co., 42 F. 351 (D. Or. 1890), aff'd, 140 U.S. 599 (1891)
(United States estopped by delay and governor's completion certificates to seek forfeiture of
wagon-road grant lands from good faith purchasers; see generally C. Amundson, History of the
Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain Wagon Road Company (1928) (M.A. thesis, Univ. of
Or.)); California & Or. Land Co. v. Munz, 29 F. 837 (C.C. Or. 1887) (wagon-road grantee
prevailed over swampland reclamation grantee, whose grant vested only upon Interior Secretary
certification; see generally Ellis, supra note 8); United States v. Reed, 28 F. 482, 487 (C.C. Or.
1886) (homestead patent upheld against claim of unpatentable mineral land: "Forty acres of this
land, cleared and planted..., furnishing a permanent home and sure support for an industrious
farmer and his growing family, is worth more to the state ... than all the mining or gold on the
creek, twice told."); Bybee v. Oregon & Cal. R.R., 26 F. 586 (C.C. Or. 1886), aff'd, 139 U.S. 663
(1891) (railroad grantee not liable for injury to adjacent landowner's ditch; see generally Ellis,
supra note 8); see also infra note 186.
12. By "formalism" I mean simply a judicial style emphasizing logical, somewhat
disembodied applications of broad legal rules, with relatively little attention to particular merits
of individual disputes. For more detailed and rigorous explications, see M. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1-30, 253-66 (1977); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 35-40, 64-74, 186-89 (1960); Kennedy, Legal Formality,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1974); Paine,
Instrumentalism v. Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 997; Scheiber,
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Deady's favored response to this "moral-formal dilemma," 13 one
common among his judicial contemporaries, was to elevate the formal
stakes and declare them controlling. He repeatedly emphasized the
importance to "civilized society" of secure land titles, common-law
conveyancing rules undiluted by doctrines like estoppel, and literal
interpretations of deed language. Although occasionally also invoking
"equity" or "justice," his decisions tended repeatedly to favor holders
of formal legal title rather than parties to whom the land arguably had
been donated or sold years earlier.
Deady's relatively formalist stance in the Portland land cases,
though especially pronounced, was not untypical of his jurisprudence
generally. Throughout his career he exhibited great respect, even rev-
erence, for the common law as a principal underpinning of western
civilization and bulwark against the irrational world of party politics.
To him and others of his generation, both within and outside the legal
profession, constitutional and common law administered by wise and
courageous judges represented the last best hope for control of polit-
ical demagoguery and social disintegration.
On a more personal level, Deady's steadfast support for legal tradi-
tion served both to justify his difficult and sometimes unpopular deci-
sions and, more generally, to dignify his own position as Oregon's
most visible representative of that tradition. In these decisions, as else-
where, Deady exhibited a tendency to parade his vast learning, a rela-
tively severe judicial demeanor, and at times even a measure of
contempt for certain contentions being urged. His abiding commit-
ment to a strongly formalist common-law heritage helped validate his
uneasy place among Portland's early elite and, ultimately, his career
choice and life's work.
The Portland land decisions did not turn out well for Deady. Twice
his immediate superior, circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, arrived in Port-
land to hear pivotal test cases. Both times, once reversing Deady,
Sawyer ruled for purchasers of small parcels, emphasizing an "honest
and reasonable construction" of early conveyancing documents and
the "intrinsic justice" of the disputes. Moreover, both times, once in a
sharply worded opinion by Justice Stephen Field, the Supreme Court
affirmed Sawyer's reasoning and results.
Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial
Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1.
13. I borrow here from Robert Cover's classic JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 226-56 (1975); see infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
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Part I to follow introduces the Donation Act, early Portland, and
Deady; Parts II, III, and IV describe and analyze the principal deci-
sions; and the Conclusion examines their significance in greater detail.
I. THE OREGON DONATION ACT, EARLY PORTLAND,
AND MATTHEW DEADY
A. The Statute
In February 1838, Senator Lewis Linn of Missouri introduced the
first of his several bills to promote settlement of the Oregon Country. 4
It called for creation of the Oregon Territory north of latitude 42
degrees N. and west of the Rocky Mountains, military occupation
anchored by a fort on the Columbia, and an official United States port
of entry on the Pacific. 5 Linn's bill did not pass, but he persevered.
Beginning in 1840, all Linn's bills called for generous land grants to
settlers, usually 640 acres. Memorials encouraging such grants began
arriving regularly in Washington. 6 In February 1843 the Senate (but
14. The first member of Congress to devote sustained attention to Oregon was Virginian John
Floyd, friend of explorer William Clark and Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton. Throughout
the 1820's Floyd circulated reports promoting the region and introduced bills to establish an
American presence there. But to most Americans, Oregon still seemed too distant; profits from
trapping, fishing, whaling, and the China trade too speculative; and diplomatic difficulties with
Great Britain, Russia, and the Indian tribes too intractable. See generally C. AMBLER, THE LIFE
AND DIARY OF JOHN FLOYD (1918); 29 THE WORKS OF HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT: HISTORY
OF OREGON 349-69 (1886) [hereinafter WORKS OF BANCROFT]; Schroeder, Rep. John Floyd,
1817-1829: Harbinger of Oregon Territory, 70 OR. HIST. Q. 333 (1969).
15. For details of the bill, see 29 WORKS OF BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 370-72; J. BROWN,
POLITICAL HISTORY OF OREGON 56 (1892); H. Head, supra note 10, at 6-12. See generally S.
REP. No. 470, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. (1838); E. LINN & N. SARGENT, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC
SERVICE OF DR. LEWIS F. LINN (1857). Linn's Missouri colleague Thomas Hart Benton was
equally devoted to Oregon. See generally T. BENTON, THIRTY YEARS VIEW passim (1856);
Hansen, Thomas Hart Benton and the Oregon Question, 63-64 Mo. HIST. REV. 489 (1969).
Outside Congress, Oregon's most influential publicist was Bostonian Hall J. Kelley, founder of
the American Society for Settlement of the Oregon Territory in 1829. See H. KELLEY, A
General Circular to all Persons of Good Character, Who Wish to Emigrate to the Oregon Territory,
in HALL J. KELLEY ON OREGON (F. Powell ed. 1972); H. KELLEY, A Geographical Sketch of
that Part of North America, Called Oregon, in HALL J. KELLEY ON OREGON (F. Powell ed.
1972); see also Powell, Hall Jackson Kelley, Prophet of Oregon, 18 OR. HIST. Q. 1, 93, 167, 271
(1917). Matthew Deady thought that to Kelley "more than any other one person ... may be
justly attributed the subsequent occupation of the country by emigrants from the United States."
M. Deady, The Annual Address, Transactions of the Third Annual Reunion of the Or. Pioneer
Ass'n 24 (1876).
16. See 29 WORKS OF BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 374-75 (describing memorials from
Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, and Missouri); see also O'Callaghan, supra note 10, at 31; H. Head,
supra note 10, at 9-10; Pike, Petitions of Oregon Settlers, 1838-1848, 34 OR. HIST. Q. 216 (1933).
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not the House) passed such a bill, prompting that year the first sub-
stantial overland migration to Oregon, about 1000 souls.17
Linn and other advocates of American manifest destiny faced a
dilemma. They needed a sizable American presence in Oregon to help
consolidate a claim to it, but could make no binding settler land grants
without first extinguishing both Indian title and British claims.18 By
the mid-1840's, however, more and more white Americans began
arriving in Oregon, making clear that neither native tribes nor the
British would dominate it much longer.19 In 1846 Britain and
America settled their boundary at latitude 49 degrees N.,2° and
throughout the next decade federal treaty officials induced the Indian
tribes to relinquish their homelands.21
17. On the 1843 migration, see 29 WORKS OF BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 391-424; P.
BURNETT, AN OLD CALIFORNIA PIONEER 97-138 (Cal. Centennial ed. 1946); Applegate, A Day
With the Cow Column in 1843, 1 OR. HIsT. Q. 371 (1900); Young, The Oregon Trail, 1 OR. HIST.
Q. 339 (1900).
18. Both the Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 52 (1787), and the Oregon Territorial Act,
ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323 (1848), pledged that Indian lands would "never be taken" without.Indian
consent. Britain and the United States twice had agreed that territory west of the Rockies.would
remain open to settlement by citizens and subjects of both nations. See Convention with Great
Britain, Oct. 20, 1818, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 248; Convention with Great Britain,
Aug. 6, 1827, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 360. For two decades beginning in 1825,
Hudson's Bay Company at Fort Vancouver remained the region's dominant non-native presence.
19. Approximate numbers of settlers arriving were 137 in 1842, 875 in 1843, 1400 in 1844,
and 3000 in 1845. See 29 WORKS OF BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 395, 448, 508; W. BOWEN,
THE WILLAMETTE VALLEY: MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT ON THE OREGON FRONTIER
12-13 (1978); Young, supra note 17, at 370.
20. Soon after settling Maine's northern boundary in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9,
1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572, both Britain and the United States became
anxious to resolve the "Oregon Question." Economic distress at home and revolt elsewhere in the
Empire quickened Britain's spirit of compromise, as did the Mexican War our own. So when
Hudson's Bay Company moved north from Fort Vancouver to Fort Victoria in 1845, the way
was clear for a treaty extending the northern U.S. boundary along latitude 49 degrees N., except
for the tip of Vancouver Island which went to Britain. Treaty with Great Britain, June 15, 1846,
United States-Great Britain, 9 Stat. 869; M. JACOaS, WINNING OREGON: A STUDY OF AN
EXPANSIONIsT MOVEMENT 209-28 (1938); F. MERK, THE OREGON QUESTION (1967);
Commager, England and Oregon Treaty of 1846, 28 OR. HiST. Q. 18 (1927); Van Alstyne,
International Rivalries in the Pacific Northwest, 46 OR. HIsT. Q. 185 (1945).
21. In June 1850, Congress finally authorized negotiations for cession of Indian title west of
the Cascades. Act of June 5, 1850, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437. Resulting treaties, typically granting
small payments and undesirable reservation lands in exchange for cession, appear at Treaty with
the Nez Percs, June 11, 1855, United States-Nez Pere6 Indians, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the
Walla-Wallas, etc., June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Willamette Indians, Jan. 22, 1855,
United States-Willamette Indians, 10 Stat. 1143; Treaty with the Cow Creek Indians, Sept. 19,
1853, United States-Cow Creek Indians, 10 Stat. 1027; Treaty with the Rogue River Indians,
Sept. 10, 1853, United States-Rogue River Indians, 10 Stat. 1018. See generally, O'Callaghan,
supra note 10, at 21-29, 107-08; S. BECKHAM, REQUIEM FOR A PEOPLE: THE ROGUE INDIANS
AND THE FRONTIERSMEN (1971); A. JOSEPHY, THE NEz PERCIt INDIANS AND THE OPENING
OF THE NORTHWEST (1965); J. ZUCKER, K. HUMMEL & B. HOGFOSS, OREGON INDIANS:
CULTURE, HISTORY & CURRENT AFFAIRS 79-92 (1983); O'Callaghan, Extinguishing Indian
323
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Meanwhile, early Oregonians themselves took steps toward securing
their land claims. In 1843 the new provisional government authorized
each male settler over 18 to claim 640 acres by occupying and improv-
ing them.22 Five years later, however, Congress declared all such local
land laws "null and void,"2 3 thus leaving Oregon temporarily without
any land law at all.
Finally, in September 1850, Congress passed the long-awaited Ore-
gon Donation Act.24 Section 4 granted to every "white settler" resid-
ing in the Oregon Territory2 5 by December 1, 1850, 320 acres if a
"single man" or 640 acres if a "married man" by December 1851, half
to his wife "in her own right."' 26 The undevised share of a settler who
complied with the four-year residence requirement but died before
Titles on the Oregon Coast, 52 OR. HIST. Q. 138 (1951); Stern, The Klamath Indians and the
Treaty of 1864, 57 OR. HIST. Q. 229 (1956).
22. On the formation of Oregon's first provisional government, featuring a dramatic
intervention by mountain man Joe Meek to break an apparent impasse, see 29 WORKS OF
BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 292-314; J. BROWN, supra note 15, at 93-99; C. CAREY, A
GENERAL HISTORY OF OREGON THROUGH EARLY STATEHOOD 327-38 (3d ed. 1971); J.
HUSSEY, CHAMPOEG: PLACE OF TRANSITION 139-40, 153-54 (1967); Robertson, The Genesis of
Political Authority and of a Commonwealth Government in Oregon, 1 OR. HIST. Q. 3 (1900). The
full text of the Organic Act appears in The Oregon Archives 1841-1843, 60 OR. HIST. Q. 211, 256
(Duniway & Riggs eds. 1959).
The 1843 Law of Land Claims set forth marking, recording, improvement, and occupancy
requirements; invalidated Hudson's Bay factor John McLoughlin's claim at the Oregon City falls
by prohibiting any claim "upon city or town sites, extensive water privileges, or other situations
necessary for the transaction of mercantile or manufacturing operations"; and granted a "six
miles square" claim to the politically powerful Methodist mission. See 29 WORKS OF
BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 311-12; J. BROWN, supra at 104; C. CAREY, supra at 334-35; Hunt,
Law and Land in a Stateless Society, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1191.
The following year, a new legislative committee repealed both the anti-McLoughlin provision
and the large mission grant. Still further amendments followed in December 1844 and July 1845.
See Act of June 25, 1844, 1844 Or. Laws 77; Amendment to the Organic Law, art. III,
1843-1872 Or. Laws 50; 29 WORKS OF BANCROFT, supra note 14, at 433-35; J. BROWN, supra at
104, 167; C. CAREY, supra at 335, 350-51; Hunt, supra at 1198-99, 1202.
23. 9 Stat. 323, 329, ch. 177, § 14 (1848).
24. Ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1850).
25. The Territory of Oregon then included today's states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and
the western part of Montana.
26. Oregon Donation Act, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496, 497 (1850) [hereinafter Donation Act].
Half-breeds were also eligible, id., and the Oregon territorial court later declared a white male
settler "married" regardless of his wife's race. Vandolfv. Otis, 1 Or. 153 (1854). A claimant also
had to be over eighteen and a United States citizen (or have declared his intention to become
such) and had to reside on and cultivate the land for four consecutive years. Donation Act § 4.
The uncommonly progressive grant of half to a wife "in her own right" resulted from emerging
Congressional solicitude for married women's property rights, the need to attract women to
distant Oregon, and territorial delegate Samuel Thurston's efforts to "surround wives with
sufficient protections so they could act as a moral bastion and source of comfort for their
husbands." Chused, supra note 10, at 45, 73; see also Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married
Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts and
Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985).
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patent issue went to his "survivor and children or heirs ... in equal
proportions."27 To discourage speculation, all future contracts for
sale of a claim prior to patent were declared "void." 28
Section 5 then encouraged future emigration by granting to all
"white male citizens" settling in Oregon by December 1, 1850, 160
acres if single and 320 acres if married, again half to the wife "in her
own right."2 9 Other important sections granted the territory itself two
townships to establish a university on each side of the Columbia, set
aside once again John McLoughlin's Oregon City claim, and required
a claimant to affirm that his land was for personal use and not
speculation.3°
Congress amended the Act in 1853, extending section 5 grants to
settlers arriving by December 1855, authorizing patents after two
rather than four years upon payment of $1.25 an acre, and granting
rights to widows whose husbands died before becoming claimants.31
The next year it granted rights to orphans, extended the 1841 Pre-
exemption Act and 1844 Townsite Act to Oregon, shortened the resi-
dence requirement to one year with cash payment, authorized claim
sales after four years' residence but before patent, and granted newly-
created Washington territory two townships for its own university. 32
27. Donation Act § 4. Similarly, rights of a settler who died before completing four years'
residence descended to his "heirs at law .... including the widow, where one is left, in equal
parts .. " Id. § 8. Heirs of a settler who died before September 1850, however, took nothing.
Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4776) (see infra text accompanying notes
87-107); Ford v. Kennedy, 1 Or. 166 (1855).
28. Donation Act § 4.
29. Id. § 5. A section 5 settler had to be at least 21, and again could satisfy the citizenship
requirement by declaring an intention to become naturalized. Id
In Silver v. Ladd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 219 (1869), the United States Supreme Court held that a
woman qualified as a "settler" under section 4 of the Donation Act, notwithstanding its
references to "single man" and "married man." See supra text accompanying note 26. The Court
contrasted the section 4 grantee language, "every white settler," with its section 5 counterpart,
"all white male citizens," and declined to indulge in "narrowness or illiberality" when construing
a federal act intended to reward a "meritorious class of persons, who had taken possession of that
country and held it for the United States, under circumstances of great danger and
discouragement." 74 U.S. at 225.
30. Donation Act, ch. 76, § 12, 9 Stat. 496, 499 (1850). The McLoughlin land claim dispute
featured large doses of Methodist villainy and resulting personal tragedy for the man justly
remembered today as the "father of Oregon." For full accounts, see 30 WORKS OF BANCROFT,
supra note 14, at 113-38; F. HOLMAN, DR. JOHN McLOUGHLIN, PATRIARCH OF THE
NORTHWEST 101-46 (1907); R. JOHNSON, JOHN McLOUGHLIN, FATHER OF OREGON 175-86,
273-96 (1935); 2 F. VICTOR, THE RIVER OF THE WEST 117-25, 249-54 (1985 ed.); Carey, Lee,
Waller and McLoughlin, 33 OR. HIsT. Q. 187 (1932).
31. Amendment to Oregon Donation Act, ch. 69, §§ 1, 8, 10 Stat. 158 (1853); see also
Chused, supra note 26, at 12-13; H. Head, supra note 10, at 55-58.
32. Amendment to Oregon Donation Act, ch. 84, 10 Stat. 305 (1854). The Townsite Act, ch.
17, 5 Stat. 657 (1844), provided for patent of public-land townsites to local authorities, in trust
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So the legislation for which Oregon settlers had hoped and peti-
tioned for over a decade was finally in place. Its mere likelihood had
encouraged thousands to journey westward, and once enacted it would
bring many thousands more. It also would become the source of sub-
stantial administrative and judicial caseloads within Oregon, including
that of federal district Judge Matthew Deady.
B. The City
In November 1843, William Overton and Asa Lovejoy pulled their
canoe into a clearing along the west bank of the Willamette River,
midway between Fort Vancouver and Oregon City, and founded Port-
land.3 3 Early the next year, Overton sold his half interest in the 640-
acre claim to Oregon City merchant Francis Pettygrove for fifty dol-
lars in supplies, departing for Texas where some said he met the wrong
end of a rope.34 By early 1845 Lovejoy and Pettygrove had enlarged
the clearing, built a cabin, and given their townsite a name. 35 Later
that year Lovejoy sold his half interest, plus a few cattle, for $1215 to
Ben Stark, recently arrived cargomaster on a trading vessel.3 6 Stark
for actual residents. It would figure prominently in Portland land claim litigation. See infra text
accompanying notes 61-63, 160. Permission to sell claims prior to patent was a response to
hardship created by lengthy General Land Office delays. See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess.
1075-76 (1854), quoted in H. Head, supra note 10, at 60. For two minor 1864 administrative
amendments, see Act of April 29, 1864, ch. 72, 13 Stat. 62; Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 154, 13 Stat.
184.
33. Overton, recently arrived from Tennessee, sold half his intended site to Oregon City
lawyer Lovejoy for the paperwork and 25 cents needed to file the claim. It may have been
Captain John Couch, leader of an 1840 trading expedition from Massachusetts, who first
recognized the clearing as "head of navigation" on the Willamette, beyond which ocean vessels
could not regularly sail. See, e.g., 1 J. GASTON, PORTLAND, OREGON: ITS HISTORY AND
BUILDERS 203-04, 214 (1911); H. ScoTT, HISTORY OF PORTLAND, OREGON 80 (1890); E.
SNYDER, EARLY PORTLAND: STUMP-TOWN TRIUMPHANT 19-22, 29-30, 38-39 (1970). In 1845
Couch recorded his own claim just north of the clearing. See infra map at note 38.
34. Little is known about Overton. James Nesmith, early Oregon politician and humorist,
described him as a "desperate, rollicking fellow" who travelled to Texas, "where, as I have
heard, his career was brought to a sudden termination by a halter." H. ScoTr, supra note 33, at
81. Lovejoy's wife doubted the story, however. Id. at 82.
35. Lovejoy from Massachusetts favored "Boston," and Pettygrove from Maine favored
"Portland." Reason proving ineffectual, they flipped a coin. H. ScoTT, supra note 33, at 86; E.
SNYDER, supra note 33, at 32.
36. Stark, from New London, Connecticut, later engaged in a variety of merchandising,
banking, and steamboating ventures, including an early effort to monopolize the Honolulu salt
trade. He studied law briefly, joined the Oregon bar in 1850, and became a territorial legislator
three years later. In late 1861, Governor John Whiteaker appointed Stark, recent convert from
Whiggery to Democracy, to serve the one-year unexpired Senate term of Col. Edward Baker,
killed on October 21 at Ball's Bluff. Newspapers denounced the appointment, calling Stark a
"secessionist" and a "traitor as infamous as any that disgraces Northern soil." At least one
speaker blamed the appointment on Matthew Deady, a "'judicial functionary in whose hands the
Executive is as clay in the hands of the potter." W. WOODWARD, THE RISE AND EARLY
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then departed, leaving the industrious Pettygrove to promote Portland
to its eventual place of prominence on the Willamette.37










HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN OREGON 1843-1868 198 n.6 (1913). An effort by certain
Portland notables to convince the Senate not to seat Stark eventually failed, despite a Senate
report confirming his alleged disloyalty. In 1863 Stark returned to New London, retaining his
extensive Portland real estate holdings. See generally Edwards, Benjamin Stark The U.S.
Senate, and 1862 Membership Issues (pts. 1 & 2), 72 OR. HIST. Q. 315 (1971), 73 OR. HIT. Q. 31
(1972).
37. By the summer of 1846 Pettygrove had built a wharf, warehouse, and store, and later that
year he moved his family from Oregon City to Portland's first frame house. He opened wagon
roads to Oregon City and the Tualatin Valley, and began selling parcels within the claim to other
settlers. Portland's population doubled in 1846 to about 100, and by August 1848 when news of
California gold arrived, it was well on its way to eclipsing Oregon City as the region's leading
commercial center. E. SNYDER, supra note 33, at 35-47.
38. Map from E. SNYDER, supra note 33, at 40 (permission to reproduce granted by Binford
& Mort Publishing). On Captain Couch, see supra note 33. Daniel Lownsdale, a tanner from
Kentucky, bought out Pettygrove in 1848 and eventually became the central figure in much
Portland land claim litigation. James Terwilliger was a blacksmith from New York. James
Stephens, naturally, operated a ferry. Elizabeth Caruthers (a.k.a. Elizabeth Thomas) was
"peculiar," according to Harvey Scott, and kept to her cabin in the woods. Following her death,
and that of her son, Finice, (the last Caruthers, as she had predicted), litigation clouded her land.
First was the question whether she could be a Donation Act "settler." See Silver v. Ladd, 74
U.S. 219 (1869); supra note 29. Then a group of Portlanders hoping to buy the land produced one
"Wrestling Joe" Thomas from St. Louis who swore he was her long-lost husband. Eventually
the various claimants compromised, and the Oregon and Transcontinental Railway Company
obtained the land, illustrating again how "loose property gravitates toward railways." H. SCOTT,
supra note 33, at 138. See generally id. at 80-138; E. SNYDER, supra note 33, at 36-40; Burnham,
The Annual Society Address: For the Land's Sake, 53 OR. HIST. Q. 223, 230-31 (1952).
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When news of California gold reached Portland in August 1848,
Pettygrove sold his interest to Daniel Lownsdale for $5000 worth of
leather and went south.39 Seven months later Lownsdale sold half of
whatever he had bought to Stephen Coffin of Oregon City for $6000,
and in December 1849 he and Coffin sold a third to Oregon City law-
yer W.W. Chapman. Those three-Lownsdale, Coffin, and Chap-
man-became commonly known as the Portland "proprietors."
In January 1850, however, Stark met Lownsdale in San Francisco
and reasserted his half interest. The two eventually agreed that Stark
would receive forty-eight prime acres in the claim's northeast corner,
subject to all prior conveyances. Two years later, in 1852, Lownsdale,
Coffin, and Chapman partitioned their remaining jointly-owned claim,
and by 1864 all four claimants-Lownsdale, Coffin, Chapman, and
Stark-received federal patents to their land.
C. The Judge
Matthew Deady dominated the Oregon legal landscape for forty
years. Born in Maryland in 1824, he was the eldest child of an Irish
immigrant father and a mother born and raised in Baltimore. His
father taught school, moving the family frequently to posts in West
Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, and Mississippi. Following his mother's
death from tuberculosis in 1834, Matthew lived for two years with his
maternal grandparents in Baltimore, then returned to his father's farm
in southern Ohio.
In early 1841, Deady had a disagreement with his father and left
home never to return. He moved to nearby Barnesville, Ohio, where
he spent four years as a blacksmith apprentice and earned a teaching
certificate at the Barnesville Academy. In late 1845, he moved to St.
Clairsville, Ohio where he taught school for a year, then read law with
a local judge. In 1847 he joined the Ohio bar, began a small practice,
and two years later crossed the plains to Oregon, seeking greater
opportunity.
Deady quickly became a force in Oregon Democratic politics. He
was elected to the territorial Assembly in 1850, to the Council (upper
house) in 1851, and Council president in 1852. He was an active
member of the "Salem Clique" which, in uneasy alliance with congres-
39. Merchant Pettygrove did well in Portland, beginning in 1843 with a share in a S15,000
inventory and departing five years later with $75,000. He later helped found Port Townsend,
Washington, returning to Portland in 1880 to proclaim, "It fills my heart with joy to see this
great city where once I saw dense woods." E. SNYDER, supra note 33, at 46; see also A.
THROCKMORTON, OREGON ARGONAUTS: MERCHANT ADVENTURERS ON THE WESTERN
FRONTIER 34-40, 55-61, 90 (1961).
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sional delegate Joe Lane, controlled Oregon politics for nearly a dec-
ade.' While in the Assembly, Deady also began his work as "Oregon
Justinian" by codifying the territorial laws.41
In 1853 Democratic President Franklin Pierce appointed Deady to
the territorial supreme court, a position he held until statehood in
1859. He was president of the 1857 state constitutional convention,
and at statehood voters elected him to the new state supreme court.
He chose, however, to accept President James Buchanan's appoint-
ment as Oregon's first federal district judge, which he remained until
his death in 1893. Twice, in 1864 and 1872, he prepared monumental
annotated editions of Oregon laws.42
Deady revered the law, especially the common law, as foundation
and guardian of a rational, orderly world. A devoted Anglophile, he
read widely in English history and literature, and for him Westminster
Hall was the supreme "bulwark of liberty and buttress of order."43
His most expansive statement of such views was a lecture entitled
"Law and Lawyers" which he delivered first in 1866 and periodically
thereafter for two decades.' In it he explained how the common law
pervaded virtually all American law, even that recently modified by
statute. Land law, for example: "Our law of real property.., is older
than the English language .... The ... forms and effect of convey-
ances-the terms used and necessary to create estates ... and pass
interests in real property-are all derived from the common law...
40. See generally R. JOHANNSEN, FRONTIER POLITICS AND THE SECTIONAL CONFLICT
3-127 (1955); W. WOODWARD, supra note 36, at 37-188 (1913); Williams, Political History of
Oregon from 1853 to 1865, 2 OR. HIsT. Q. 1 (1901); P. Overmeyer, supra note 9, at 40-98. For a
remarkably literate 1852 satire of the Salem Clique, by Whig newspaper editor William Lysander
Adams (a.k.a. "Breakspear"), see W. ADAMS, A MELODRAMA ENTITLED "TREASON,
STRATAGEMS, AND SPOILS" (G. Belknap ed. 1968).
41. See Statutes of a General Nature Passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of
Oregon (1851); see also Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 23 OR. L. REv. 22 (1943);
Peters, The "First" Oregon Code: Another Look at Deady's Role, 82 OR. HIST. Q. 383 (1981); P.
Overmeyer, supra note 9, at 111-27.
42. 1845-1864 Or. Laws; 1843-1872 Or. Laws. See generally Beardsley, supra note 41; P.
Overmeyer, supra note 9, at 99-110. Deady drafted as well as codified many territorial and early
state laws. E.g., 1862 Or. Laws 3-286 (Code of Civil Procedure); 1862 Or. Gen. Laws 3-13
(general incorporation law); 1845-1864 Or. Laws 441-582 (Code of Criminal Procedure and
Penal Code); see also H. BANCROFT, supra note 9, at 621-23. But see Peters, supra note 41.
43. M. Deady, supra note 15.
44. M. Deady, Law and Lawyers: A Lecture Delivered Before the Portland Law Association
(Dec. 6, 1866). The most notable delivery was at Georgetown University law school in January
1882 during Deady's extended trip east. See 2 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 386. For other
occasions, see id. at 335, 444, 523, 531. Richard Chused has used the lecture for a similar point.
Chused, supra note 26, at 25.
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and speak its language."45 His deeper point, though, was normative
and political:
The common law people-the English race, wherever they go, estab-
lish limited governments, with Parliaments and juries; . . [T]he com-
mon law is the source and panoply of all those features of our system,
which distinguish us from the subjects of absolute governments, ancient
or modern,-either by monarchs or majorities. It was made by freemen
for freemen.4
6
Deady thus strongly associated the continued vitality of the com-
mon law, including even its "forms and effect of conveyances," with
preservation of Anglo-American ideals of limited, enlightened self-
government. Generations of "profound jurists"47 had defended those
ideals against the tyranny of both monarch and mob. Deady was
determined to extend that tradition to the shores of the Pacific,48 and
the Portland land claim litigation seemed to provide him an early
opportunity.
II. PUBLIC DEDICATIONS: THE LEVEE AND
THE SCHOOLHOUSE
Three clusters of Portland land claim litigation found their way to
Matthew Deady's federal court between 1861 and 1880. In the first,
city officials and interested landowners alleged irrevocable public dedi-
cations by the early proprietors of a large riverfront levee area and a
downtown schoolhouse site. In the second, Daniel Lownsdale's heirs
sought to reclaim land he and other proprietors had "sold" before
obtaining title. And third, purchasers of lots within Ben Stark's forty-
eight acres, notably brothers Lewis and Addison Starr, sued to quiet
titles. In all three, Deady inclined strongly toward holders of formal
45. M. Deady, supra note 44, at 13.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Deady wrote in his memoir for Bancroft: "Like other profound jurists, Judge Deady
attaches great importance to the study of the principles of the common law." H. BANCROFT,
supra note 9, at 629.
48. Deady made this point explicitly in his 1875 Annual Address to the Oregonian Pioneer
Association:
[T]he American settler was always animated ...with the heroic thought that he was
permanently engaged in reclaiming the wilderness ... and extending the area of liberty. ...
[Hie was here to do for this country what his ancestors had done for savage England
centuries before-to plant a community ... wherein the language of the Bible, Shakespeare
and Milton should be spoken by millions then unborn, and the law of Magna Charta and
Westminster Hall be the bulwark of liberty and the buttress of order for generations to
come.
M. Deady, supra note 15. See generally 1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 192-95.
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legal title and emphasized repeatedly the importance of secure land
titles based on indisputable written records.
A. Lownsdale v. City of Portland (1861)
Disagreement about ownership of the Portland waterfront began as
early as 1850 when Josiah Parrish,4 9 owner of property facing adjacent
Water Street, sued Lownsdale, Coffin, Chapman, and others to enjoin
construction of private buildings along the riverbank."0 Parrish
alleged that between 1845 and 1850 Lovejoy, Pettygrove, and finally
Lownsdale all had sold lots near the river with assurances that the
fractional parcels east of Water Street would remain a public levee.
Territorial Justice O.C. Pratt granted Parrish a preliminary injunc-
tion, following which the parties apparently compromised: Parrish
would dismiss his suit in exchange for a firm commitment that the
waterfront between Washington and Main Streets would remain open
to the public. The compromise eventually failed, however, and in late
1853 the case went to trial before the full territorial court.51
Justice Olney's opinion in Parrish v. Stephens52 emphatically
endorsed Parrish's position. In 1845 Pettygrove and Lovejoy had laid
out Portland on a plat indicating clearly that the land between Water
Street and the river would remain open to the public. That plat consti-
tuted a "prima facie dedication" of the disputed strip, one which was
both "apparent" and "reasonable" in early Portland.53 Moreover, the
two early proprietors had declared repeatedly to town residents that
the levee would remain public. Nearly a dozen witnesses including
49. Rev. Josiah L. Parrish left New York for Oregon in 1839 with his wife and three children
to labor and preach at Jason Lee's Methodist Mission. For the next 55 years "Father Parrish"
pursued both wealth and grace with notable success, as farmer, sheep rancher, railroad investor,
philanthropist, and university overseer. See C. DOBBS, MEN OF CHAMPOEG 71-74 (1932); H.
HINES, HISTORY OF OREGON 537-40 (1893).
50. Lownsdale v. City of Portland, 15 F. Cas. 1036 (D. Or. 1861) (No. 8579).
51. Facts for the People of Portland Relating to the Levee Case, (March 1860) (anonymous
pamphlet) [hereinafter Facts for the People], recounts these early events in detail. According to
it, one proprietor refused to ratify the compromise, then Parrish himself repudiated it alleging he
had signed when ill and "incompetent." Id. at 4. See also G. BELKNAP, OREGON IMPRINTS
1845-1870, at 129 (1968). The Oregonian attributed authorship to Alonzo Leland, H.B. Jones,
and attorney W.H. Farrar, all "interested in jumping the public property of this city."
Oregonian, Mar. 31, 1860, at 2, col. 5.
52. 1 Or. 59 (1853).
53. The proprietors had wished to insure that "loading and unloading of vessels, which
confers upon the town its principal importance, should not be embarrassed by the caprice and
avarice of private persons .... " They therefore adopted the "usual and proper means of
guarding against this evil," by designating Water Street to adjoin the river, to "form the
connecting link between all the highways of the town and the great highway of water, upon
which the town is dependent . ... " Id. at 62.
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Lovejoy himself testified to such declarations, producing "unhesitating
belief in the mind of the court that the strip was thrown out to the
public."54
Finally, even without the plat or repeated declarations, the early
proprietors' abandonment of the land to the free and apparently right-
ful use of the public itself estopped them and their purchasers from
reasserting ownership. The court invoked turpe est fidem fallere, a
"fundamental principle of natural justice,"55 and emphasized that the
evidence supported its result with a degree of certainty unusual to liti-
gated cases. Even the proprietors had recognized the public right until
developing an "itching palm for this attractive property" and yielding
to a "desire and hope of reclaiming the tempting prize."56
The "vexed Levee question"57 continued, however. In early 1860,
George Vaughn began building on a riverfront site purchased from
Daniel Lownsdale. City authorities arrested his workers, razed his
structures, "fanned up a flame of vengeance," and aroused "passion
and the mobocratic spirit of our community."58 Later that same year
Daniel's son James Lownsdale began building on his riverfront prop-
54. Id. at 69; see also Reed, Lovejoy's Pioneer Narrative, 31 OR. HIST. Q. 236, 255 (1930)
("Lovejoy maintained that he and Pettygrove gave the river front for a public levee. Pettygrove
denied this.").
55. The court translated, "It is base to disappoint the expectations we have authorized." I
Or. at 69.
56. Id. at 70. The court's decree, authorizing the nonparty city to remove obstructions,
reflected an early public-trust conception. The city, though not owner, was "guardian of this
ground" with the "right and duty... to see that it is kept in a fit state for use, to the extent of the
public wants." Id. at 72. See generally The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and
Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980); Selvin, The Public Trust
Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403.
The following term the court denied a rehearing petition. It declared chancery "quite as
competent as a court of law" to decide the questions involved, declined to apply the "public
nuisance doctrine," that only public authorities could sue to enjoin a widespread injury, and held
that the early Pettygrove/Lovejoy dedication did bind their successors, even though made while
title remained in the United States. "Public levies are almost as necessary ... as public streets,"
concluded Chief Justice Williams. Parrish v. Stephens, 1 Or. 73, 74-76 (1853). Newly-appointed
Associate Justice Matthew Deady dissented without opinion.
Five years later, the United States Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Because Congress had created no private rights in Oregon land until the September
1850 Donation Act, neither party had "any title to or interest in the land whatever" in July 1850
when Parrish had filed suit; therefore, the case involved neither a federal question nor the S2000
in dispute required for an appeal to the Supreme Court, and that Court had "no jurisdiction...
to examine and revise the decree of the Supreme Court of Oregon." Lownsdale v. Parrish, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 290, 294 (1858).
57. Facts for the People, supra note 51, at 12.
58. Id. at 14.
Vol. 63:317, 1988
Matthew Deady and Federal Public Land Law
erty, and, facing threats of similar city action, sued in federal court for
an injunction and a decree quieting title.59
Deady granted Lownsdale a temporary restraining order, then ruled
on the legal merit of several city responses. Its first response, natu-
rally, was that the territorial court already had decided the same dis-
pute in its favor. But Deady explained that a prior decree was res
judicata only if it was mutual, binding both parties. The earlier Par-
rish decision would not have bound the city because neither it nor
anyone in privity with it had been a party. Therefore, the decision also
did not bind Lownsdale. 60
The city's second contention was that the proprietors' entire Port-
land land claim was invalid because the 1844 federal Townsite Act6'
precluded private townsite claims. Deady ruled, however, that the
1848 Territorial Act had not extended the Townsite Act to Oregon so
the Portland proprietors' claims were lawful. Congress had intended
the Townsite Act for unsettled regions, not one like Oregon which by
1848 had extensive settlements, a provisional government, and even an
established land law:
It would tax the ingenuity of man to find a provision in the land system
of the United States, as it stood in 1848, less applicable to the condition
of Oregon, or that would have worked greater hardship, confusion and
injustice than the Act of 1844.
To the thrifty and enterprising settler it would have said: By your
management and industry you have built up a town on your land
claimed and thereby lost it. If you had been content to live upon it in a
seven-by-nine cabin with tottering lean-to attached, and merely pastured
it with a few Spanish cattle and cayuse ponies, it would have been
yours.
6 2
Besides, Deady added, Congress expressly extended the Townsite Act
to Oregon in 1854, which settled "beyond cavil or doubt" that it had
not done so earlier.63
59. Lownsdale v. Portland, 15 F. Cas. 1030 (D. Or. 1861) (No. 8578). Ironically, former
territorial Chief Justice George Williams represented him. See supra note 56.
60. Lownsdale, 15 F. Cas. at 1030, 1031-34. Deady also thought the territorial court decree
"void" for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's dismissal of Lownsdale's
appeal for lack of a recognizable interest in the land necessarily meant also that the territorial
court itself had had "nothing... to adjudicate." Id. at 1033. Cf. Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 97 (1865).
61. On the Townsite Act, see supra note 32.
62. Lownsdale, 15 F. Cas. at 1034.
63. Id. at 1035; accord Marlin v. T'Vault, 1 Or. 66 (1854). In 1860, however, the General
Land Office had concluded otherwise, issuing the city a patent for Ben Stark's 48 acres. See infra
text accompanying note 160. Deady responded "respectfully" that "such decision does not
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The city's third defense-recalling again the earlier Parrish deci-
sion-was that in 1845 Pettygrove and Lovejoy had dedicated the
levee to public use, that Portlanders had accepted the dedication by
long and continuous occupation, and that Daniel Lownsdale himself
had repeatedly affirmed it even after his 1849 purchase of Pettygrove's
interest. Again Deady was unreceptive, however, calling a portion of
the question too plain for argument. Pettygrove and Lovejoy had
owned "no interest in the soil" beyond "naked possession" and so had
had "nothing to dedicate."64 Whether Daniel Lownsdale himself had
dedicated the levee, after obtaining a Donation Act interest, was an
issue for trial.
Following such a trial six months later, Deady ruled that the city
failed to sustain its burden of proof. Evidence of a public dedication
needed to be clear and cogent. When consisting simply of casual and
disjointed conversations and remarks susceptible to various interpreta-
tions, given by witnesses tainted by prepossessions and prejudices, it
had to be closely scrutinized:
Security and certainty of title to real property are among the most
important objects of the law in any civilized community. Any act
intended and permitted to affect the ownership or use of such property
the law requires to be done or suffered with certain solemnities and for-
malities, so that the fact may be read and known of all men. What is
shown to have once belonged to a person he is not presumed to have
parted with; but the fact, if claimed, must be satisfactorily proved.65
Moreover, other evidence suggested affirmatively the lack of any
Lownsdale dedication. His 1850 city map depicted Water Street, by
then called Front Street, as one of normal width bounded by two par-
allel lines, with fractional blocks on the east extending to the river-
bank. In April and May 1851, Lownsdale published six notices in the
weekly Oregonian that he claimed the disputed land. And, most tell-
ingly, the Portland city council in April 1852 "deliberately recognized
and adopted" his map as correct, and in 1854 and 1858 taxed the frac-
tional blocks as private property.66 For all those reasons, Deady per-
petually enjoined the city from asserting any right, title, or interest to
conclude the Courts in a proper case . . . from deciding what laws were applicable to the
Territory at a particular time." Lownsdale, 15 F. Cas. at 1034.
64. Id. at 1035.
65. Lownsdale v. Portland, 15 F. Cas. 1036, 1039 (D. Or. 1861) (No. 8579).
66. Even as late as 1860-1861 the council vacillated wildly on the levee issue. In August 1860
it again asserted public rights; ten months later it repealed that ordinance; then in August 1861,
four months before Deady's final Lownsdale decision, it again declared the levee to be private.
See Oregonian, Aug. 13, 1861, at 1, col. 1; Aug. 8, 1861, at 3, col. 1; June 18, 1861, at 2, col. 4.
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a sizable portion of its waterfront.67 His most influential contemporar-
ies, even those who thought the decision unfortunate, tended to assign
responsibility elsewhere.68
67. Lownsdale, 15 F. Cas. at 1040. A quarter century later Deady heard Coffin v. City of
Portland, 27 F. 412 (C.C. Or. 1886), an effort by heirs of proprietor Stephen Coffin to reclaim the
levee south of Jefferson Street, which Coffin clearly had dedicated to the city in 1850. The heirs
contended that the dedication was void because contrary to public policy, and that an 1885
statute licensing a railroad to use the area renounced and abrogated the dedication, creating a
resulting trust in their favor.
Deady responded sharply. Portland's charter granted it authority to hold property for public
purposes, and it would be "sheer assumption" for a court to inquire into the "policy" of its doing
so:
The fact that the river front is generally in the hands of private parties... has no bearing on
the question of the authority of Portland in the premises.... [Ilt would be sheer assumption
for the court to say that it is contrary to public policy for Portland to have a public landing
on the river bank, or to improve and maintain the same, either directly or through the
agency of third persons.
Id. at 418. Nor did the license to a private railroad extinguish the dedication. True, the legisla-
ture could not devote the land to a use clearly inconsistent with the dedication, but in no case
would it revert to the donor. The heirs' theory that the legislature, by "passage of a void act,
whereby it undertook to divert the use of this property from the public to a private corporation,
has caused the right of the public therein to be forfeited," would make "one person answer for
the sins of another, with a vengeance." Id. at 419. See generally West, Jefferson Street Public
Levee and the Railroads, 43 OR. HisT. Q. 135 (1942).
68. Jesse Applegate, the "Sage of Yoncalla" and one of Deady's most thoughtful early
correspondents, wrote to him before the decision that young Lownsdale surely would lose
because "there can be no doubt the City will be able to establish the fact of the dedication."
Letter from Applegate to Deady (Nov. 4, 1861) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society).
Later, however, Applegate saw the matter differently: "The 'City' had already decided the case
against itself, by approving Short's map and survey, and you had nothing to do but to follow
it. .. ." Letter from Applegate to Deady (Feb. 5, 1862) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical
Society). On. Applegate generally, see Baker, Experience, Personality and Memory: Jesse
Applegate and John Minto Recall Pioneer Days, 81 OR. HisT. Q. 229 (1980); S. Frear, Jesse
Applegate: An Appraisal of an Uncommon Pioneer (1961) (M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Or.).
Applegate, a nonlawyer, also offered a persuasive critique of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
denial in Parrish: "I think the decision of the Supreme Court of the U.S. in the Parrish case tho'
technically correct might have been made with equal propriety to extend to the merits of the
case. For though neither party owned the land, they had acquired lawfully certain rights in it of
a value equal to the amount required to justify an appeal to that Court." Letter from Applegate
to Deady, supra. Cf Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97 (1865).
Oregonian editor Harvey Scott later expressed a similar view:
[Tihe people of the city took no wise steps to secure their rights if they had any .... The
common council of Portland acted in a manner peculiar and contradictory.... In 1852,...
because the Brady map was most convenient they declared it to be the correct plat of
Portland. By this stroke they signed away whatever right they had to the levee.
H. Scorr, supra note 33, at 134; see also J. GASTON, supra note 33, at 225-26. Scott admired
Deady's legal ability and generally agreed with his hierarchical world view; Deady in turn con-
sidered Scott a "protege" to whom he would "sometimes lend ... a hand." Letter from Deady to
William Meek (Sept. 14, 1868) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). In 1890 Deady paid
$200 for a biographical notice in Scott's history, and likely helped edit at least material relating
to him. 2 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 597. On Scott generally, see Nash, Scott of The Oregonian:
The Editor as Historian, 70 OR. HisT. Q. 197 (1969).
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B. Chapman v. School District No. 1 (1866)
Four years after Lownsdale, Deady again declined to recognize an
alleged public dedication. In Chapman v. School District No. 1,69
plaintiff Cullen Chapman sued a school district, the city, and Ben
Stark to quiet title to a one-fourth interest in a valuable downtown
Portland lot. Stark, though a defendant, similarly claimed the remain-
ing three-fourths against the district and city.
The facts, inevitably, were complex. In May 1849, a group of Por-
tlanders met to subscribe a schoolhouse. They elected "trustees" who
supervised construction of a building that autumn, and in November
proprietors Lownsdale and Coffin executed a bond promising to con-
vey the land beneath it when they received title from the United
States. Early the following year, Stark agreed with the proprietors to
honor such commitments within his forty-eight acres.7°
For the next three years, various groups used the building as a class-
room, a meeting hall, even occasionally a courtroom. Then, in
November 1852, the directors of newly-formed School District No. 1
leased it from the trustees, but apparently never took possession. A
flurry of activity occurred in late 1857, when Lownsdale and two
others, Carter and Smith, conveyed the lot to William McEwan and
J.T. Holmes, and William King, purporting to act for the original sub-
scribers, did the same. Chapman and Stark claimed through Stark's
1860 federal patent, and again the issue Deady faced was whether an
early proprietor (this time Stark) had dedicated the land to public
use.
7 1
As in Lownsdale, Deady ruled first on a series of legal challenges to
the defendants' answer. He overruled most, reserving the issues for
trial.72 He did, however, reaffirm his view that the Townsite Act did
not apply to Oregon before 1854, 7 and strike a defense alleging that
Stark had obtained his patent fraudulently.74
69. 5 F. Cas. 483 (C.C. Or. 1865) (No. 2607); 5 Cas. 487 (C.C. Or. 1866) (No. 2608).
70. See supra text following note 39.
71. Fifteen years earlier the city had sued to quiet title to the same lot, also alleging a public
dedication. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed a verdict in its favor, finding error in the trial
court's admission of hearsay "reputation" evidence. See McEwan v. City of Portland, I Or. 300
(1860).
72. "Exceptions for impertinence are only allowed when it is apparent that the matter
excepted to is not material or relevant, or is stated with needless prolixity. If it may be material
or relevant, the exception will not be allowed .... " Chapman, 5 F. Cas. at 483.
73. "Time and reflection have only confirmed in my mind the correctness of the conclusions
arrived at in [Lownsdale]." Id. at 485; see supra text accompanying note 63.
74. In Deady's view, the fraud allegation impermissibly sought "affirmative relief." A
defendant could not "become a complainant and seek affirmative relief, as a specific
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A year later, Deady heard evidence and ruled on the merits. Herald-
ing the importance of secure private land titles, he found no clear and
satisfactory proof of a dedication to the public. He declined to pre-
sume such a dedication from long public use because with one minor
exception neither the city nor the school district had ever occupied the
site. Moreover, the actual evidence of an oral dedication by Stark was
unsatisfactory both in fact and in law. The alleging party had a heavy
burden:
Where it is claimed that a dedication has been made by parol, it ought to
be shown plainly and distinctly, and not left to be inferred from facts
and circumstances ....
A dedication by parol is an exception to the general and salutary rule
of the law, which provides that no interest in lands shall pass without a
writing. To allow this exception, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof.., would be subversive of the policy of the law, and dangerous to
private rights.75
The defendants' only evidence was that occasionally, "in casual con-
versations with acquaintances," Stark had expressed a willingness to
convey the property to the city if it would reimburse him the money he
had spent improving it. Such conversations were "no evidence of a
dedication"; to the contrary, they were an "assertion of Stark's present
title to the lot." 76
Furthermore, Deady continued, an oral dedication by Stark prior to
the Donation Act, even if proved, would not bind his after-acquired
estate. A warranty deed bound after-acquired title, but a quitclaim
deed or oral dedication did not:
I am inclined to hold that a parol dedication to public uses, rests upon
no different ground than a quitclaim (feed, and if made before September
27, 1850, although by a party then in possession, who afterwards took
the legal estate under the act, it would not bind the afterward acquired
77estate.
performance of an agreement to convey .... Id. at 486. Another view, however, is that the
defendants sought merely to defend Chapman's quiet title suit by establishing a fraudulent link
in his chain of title.
75. Chapman v. School Dist. No. 1, 5 F. Cas. 487, 491 (1865) (No. 2608). Deady also
invoked the state court ruling in McEwan, I Or. 300, see supra note 71, to exclude "common
reputation" testimony that the city owned the land. Such testimony, besides being "very meagre
and unsatisfactory," alleged a reputation arising "subsequent to the commencement of this
controversy"; if allowed, it would be "very easy (if not common) for a few active and interested
persons to make a reputation on the subject." Chapman, 5 F. Cas. at 492 (citing 1 S.
GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE 155-56 (1842)).
76. Chapman, 5 F. Cas. at 492.
77. Id. at 491.
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Finally, what about the November 1849 bond from Lownsdale and
Coffin to the trustees, together with Stark's agreement to honor such
commitments? Deady answered that the bond would have failed to
bind even Lownsdale and Coffin because the subscribers had not estab-
lished a private school, as required, exclusive of any restrictions of any
school law. Defendant School District No. 1 was instead a "public
corporation of the State," governed by the "general law."'7 8 Moreover,
the bond ran not to the city or school district, neither of which had
even existed in 1849, but to "trustees of the school and town meeting
house of Portland," who represented only "private individuals-the
subscribers."7 9 And third, even ignoring such matters of form, Lown-
sdale and Coffin's covenant could not bind Stark, a direct donee of the
federal government not in privity of estate with them.80 As for Stark's
own agreement to honor prior sales, that was between him and prom-
isees Lownsdale and Coffin. The city and school district were not par-
ties to it, so could not enforce it.
Near the end of his opinion, Deady expressed more simply his view
of the dispute:
The truth of the matter seems to be this-sundry individuals in and
about Portland, being about to build a private school and meeting
house,... the occupant of the land claim gave the trustees of this enter-
prise a bond for a deed to lot 3, provided they would.., proceed accord-
ing to the conditions prescribed therein. The house was soon built by
these trustees, and used from time to time for private schools, religious
meeting and public meetings, but no attention was paid to the conditions
of the bond or any steps taken by any one to procure the appointment of
the trustees and the creation of the corporation contemplated. In other
words, the project proved abortive and was abandoned. 8'
He concluded by insisting that his decision coincided with both law
and justice:
So, upon every aspect of the case, it appears to me that the well settled
rules of law are against the claims of the defendants, school district No.
1 or the city of Portland. Nor does it seem to me inappropriate... for
the Court to declare, that as against these defendants ... who seek at
this late day . . . to entitle themselves to the benefit of this supposed
78. Id. at 493.
79. Id. at 492. For the incorporation of Portland, see Act of Jan. 23, 1851, 1851 Or. Local
Laws 16.
80. "Lownsdale and Coffin .. .were mere occupants of the public land.... They had no
estate.., to convey to Stark, and conveyed none.... Stark took the land as an original settler,
under the act of September 27, 1850, and derives his title directly from the United States ......
Chapman, 5 F. Cas. 487, at 496.
81. Id. at 495.
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trust, the right of the defendant Stark coincides with the equity and jus-
tice of the case. These defendants appear to me to be not only without
right, but without merit. Their claim seems to be an afterthought, put
forward long after the really meritorious parties, the original subscrib-
ers, had abandoned the scheme as visionary and impracticable.8 2
Thus, in both Lownsdale and Chapman, certainty of land title was par-
amount; dedications to .the public were not presumed; and traditional
common-law conveyancing principles governed even the rudimentary
transfers and assurances by Portland's earliest proprietors. These for-
malistic themes, though softened occasionally by supporting fairness
justifications, would recur in Deady's later Portland land claim deci-
sions as well.
III. THE LOWNSDALE HEIRS LITIGATION
Following the 1850 allocation of forty-eight acres to Ben Stark, and
the 1852 partition of the remaining Portland claim among proprietors
Lownsdale, Coffin, and Chapman, the Lownsdale claim consisted of
180 acres extending west from the river:83 '
82. Id. at 496. This time not all Deady's readers concurred. His friend and former United
States Attorney E.W. McGraw, by then practicing in San Francisco, wrote Deady that a "strict
regard for truth and veracity" obliged him to state that he "dissent[ed] in toto" from the decision.
Neither Stark nor his one-quarter assignee Chapman ever acquired "the shadow of a title to that
lot" because neither had possessed or even exercised any control over it, as the Donation Act
required. Deady's assertion that the defendants had never occupied the premises was
"disingenuous" and "in all kindness and sincerity[, an] equivoque ... unworthy of you..."
continued McGraw, because their tenant's possession had been both lengthy and "notoriously,
openly, undeniably and incontrovertibly adverse to Stark." Moreover, it was not the public
defendants, but Stark who claimed the property as an "afterthought." Letter from McGraw to
Deady (Jan. 19, 1867) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). Deady later recommended
his "clear headed, honest, abrupt brusque" friend for United States district judge in San
Francisco. 1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 138, 299.
83. Map from E. MACCOLL, THE SHAPING OF A CITY: BuSINESS AND POLITICS IN




PLAT OF LAND CLAIMS COVERED BY THE CITY
Daniel and his wife Nancy duly filed their notice of claim-east half
to him, west half to her; in 1860 the General Land Office issued them a
patent certificate; and five years later, after both had died, it finally
issued a patent.
As early as 1850, however, the proprietors began selling smaller
parcels, including many within the eventual Lownsdale claim. Nancy
died intestate in 1854, leaving Daniel and four children, Isabella and
William Jr. by her first husband William Gillihan, and Millard and
Ruth by Daniel. Eight years later, in 1862, Daniel also died intestate,
also leaving four children-James and Mary by his first wife Ruth,
and Millard and Ruth by Nancy- plus two granddaughters, Ida and
Emma, surviving his and Ruth's deceased daughter Sarah.
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Win. Nancy Daniel Ruth
Gillihan - Lownsdale - Lownsdale - Lownsdale
d. 1850 m(1) d. 1854 m(2) d. 1862 m(1) d. 1830
Win. Jr. Isabella Millard Ruth Mary James Sarah
I
Ida Emma
Then in 1864 Nancy's Gillihan children obtained a state court decree
partitioning her ninety acres among Daniel and her four children.8 4
More serious litigation began in 1866, however, when Daniel's heirs
asserted title to parcels he and the other proprietors had sold. Stated
simply, the heirs' basic contentions were that alleged promises by
Daniel to convey after-acquired title did not bind them, and in any
event, Daniel did not effectively convey parcels within Nancy's west
half of the Lownsdale claim, which she had owned in her own right.
Matthew Deady generally relished a challenge, especially one that
might bring him a measure of public acclaim for learned, principled
decision making. But he could not have enjoyed deciding these cases,
which easily rank among the most complex and difficult of his long
career. His diary, though not beginning until 1871, contains several
troubled references to them, including the weary 1883 refrain, "I have
one more of the old Lownsdale cases, and then I am done after 15
years." 85
Editor Harvey Scott later recalled the "universal attention" and
"multitude of opinions" lavished on the cases; the "sympathies of all
kinds" excited by the prospect that "many innocent purchasers"
would be evicted; and, in a Deadyesque phrase, the "confessedly very
great" legal difficulties facing the purchasers. He described Deady's
basic dilemma this way:
It was evident from the start that the courts must proceed in one of
two ways--either to stick to the letter of the law and.., recognize no
84. The court divided the 90 acres three-fifths to William Gillihan Jr. and Millard and Ruth
Lownsdale and two-fifths to the heirs and assigns of Daniel (who in 1860 had purchased Isabella
Gillihan's fifth). Because Daniel already had sold more than two-fifths, however, the court also
imposed compensating liens, or "owelty," totaling $39,000 on the sold lots. See, e.g., Fields v.
Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 30-31 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4776).
85. 2 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 409; see also 1 PHARISEE at 18, 19, 21, 69, 195.
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title except that conferred by the United States Patent; or else to take a
general view of the circumstances and necessities of the case and decide
upon the general equities and common understanding of all parties, and
to let possession count for all that it was worth.
86
In general, Deady responded to the dilemma with a characteristic lean
toward "letter of the law," a position which became acutely apparent
in 1871 when Circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer arrived in Portland with
his own emphatic, opposing lean.
A. Fields v. Squires (1872)
Purchaser James Fields filed the first suit,87 alleging ownership of a
parcel in the Nancy Lownsdale tract which the proprietors had con-
veyed to W.W. Chapman individually in June 1850 with a covenant to
convey full legal title "if they should obtain [it] from the United
States."8 8 Deady worked his way through a maze of property and
public land law issues, which were both "interesting in themselves"
and "of the highest practical importance to this community.,
89
The heirs first asserted a series of complete defenses to the proprie-
tors' 1850 covenant. None persuaded Deady. The rule that a joint
covenant could not be enforced against one obligor alone (or the heirs
86. H. Scorr, supra note 33, at 125; see also supra note 68.
87. Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4776), aff'd sub noam. Davenport v.
Lamb, 80 U.S. 418 (1872).
88. Id. at 30. Fields sued originally in state court. The heirs petitioned for removal, but
among those served initially with process only granddaughter Ida Squires resided outside
Oregon. In Field v. Lownsdale, 9 F. Cas. 20 (C.C. Or. 1867) (No. 4769), Deady remanded the
case against all in-state heirs, but retained jurisdiction over defendant Squires. The 1789
Judiciary Act had authorized removal only when all defendants were citizens of another state.
In 1866, however, Congress had enacted the "separable controversy" rule permitting a single
out-of-state defendant to remove her portion of the case alone if the suit were "one in which there
can be a final determination ... so far as it concerns [her], without the presence of the other
defendants ...." Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306; see also the Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73, 79-80 (1789). Because the Lownsdale heirs necessarily claimed the disputed land as
"tenants in common," the interest of each was "distinct from that of the other," and the suit
"separate as to each of them." 9 F. Cas. at 22. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 61-62 (1927); 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 187 (2d ed. 1985).
Always an advocate of broad federal jurisdiction, Deady thought the earlier rule had created
"difficulty, not to say hardship" for out-of-state defendants "debarred of this right" by being
joined with a local codefendant. Field v. Lownsdale, 9 F. Cas. at 22. Moreover, even the new
rule was inadequate, for there were "many reasons" why jurisdiction should extend to "the
whole of a controversy, where some only of the defendants are aliens or citizens of another
state." But Congress had not yet "'seen proper to provide for its exercise to that extent.'" Id.; cf
Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880); Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. For Fields'
later unsuccessful effort to retain other out-of-state defendants in state court, see Fields v. Lamb,
9 F. Cas. 27 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4775); Fields v. Lamb, 2 Or. 340 (1868).
89. Squires, 9 F. Cas. at 31.
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of one alone) applied sensibly in a damages action but not a quiet title
suit. The similar rule that a covenant did not bind unnamed persons
applied perhaps to the "ancient feudal warranty" described in 13th
century English statutes, 90 but not to modem "personal covenants."
And the well-known rule that, because no estate passed to Chapman
in 1850, the covenant did not "run with the land" to remote purchas-
ers, also had been "modified substantially," so that mere possession
under a deed became "sufficient estate to carry the covenants to the
assignee." Such newer doctrine, Deady explained, was "peculiarly
adapted to the-early circumstances of this country" where settler land
rights were often merely possessory.9 1
So the proprietors' covenant to convey title did bind the Lownsdale
heirs, but to what extent? What interest had Daniel acquired "from
the United States"? When Nancy died intestate in 1854, Daniel and
each of her four children inherited an undivided one-fifth interest in
her right to ninety acres.92 When the patent issued eight years later,
did Daniel take at least his one-fifth from the United States, or did he
take it instead by descent from Nancy?
The heirs maintained that the legendary Rule in Shelley's Case9 3
applied to Daniel's one-fifth, compelling the conclusion that he took
by descent rather than devise. Venturing into an "abstruse branch of
the law," which had "in times past been fruitful of unprofitable subtle-
ties," Deady concluded finally that the Rule did not apply. Nancy's
Donation Act estate was merely a "qualified or determinable fee,"
inadequate to invoke the Rule. Her heirs, including Daniel, inherited
not title but simply her right to obtain title: "[T]hey took as direct
donees of the United States, by force of the grant, and not as heirs of
Nancy, who left nothing for them to inherit, because her estate in the
90. "By the joint operation of the Statutes de bigamis [4 Edw. (1272)] and quia emptores [18
Edw. (1290)] .... this warranty did not ... bind the heirs unless mentioned in it." Id. at 32. See
generally A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 259-61 (1950); 2 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 300-48, 576 (3d ed. 1923); A. SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 21-22, 54-55 (2d ed. 1986).
91. Squires, 9 F. Cas. at 31-36. For authority throughout, Deady cited principally W.
RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE 354-55 (3d ed. 1860) and 2 E. WASHBURNE, REAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1864).
92. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
93. The Rule in Shelley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 1 Co. Rep. 93b (1581), provided that a
grant to A for life, remainder to her heirs, conveyed an "estate of inheritance," permitting A to
"alien the fee and bar the heirs." If A died seized, as Deady explained, her heirs took "only as
heirs, by descent." Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 35 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4776). See generally
L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 43-51 (2d ed. 1966).
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land terminated with her death."94 "Justice and equity" supported
this ruling as well:
With the conclusion now reached, coincides the justice and equity of
this case. As to this fifth it was obtained by Daniel H. under just such
circumstances as the parties to the deed contemplated when this cove-
nant was made and accepted-by gift from the United States. The com-
plainant, as the assignee of Chapman, is entitled under the ... covenant
to a conveyance of this fifth from the heirs or grantees of Daniel H. 95
A second fifth raised a different issue. In 1860, two years before
patent, Daniel had purchased the one-fifth right inherited by Nancy's
daughter Isabella. Fields naturally urged that if Daniel took the fifth
he inherited from Nancy as a direct donee, he likewise took the fifth he
purchased from Isabella. Deady, however, did not agree. When her
mother died, Isabella became absolute owner of this interest. There-
fore, Daniel "in no sense obtained it from the United States," and his
heirs were not bound, "either in law or morals," to convey it to pur-
chaser Fields.96
Next, Fields asserted two theories under which the entire 180-acre
Lownsdale claim would have gone to Daniel alone. Had either suc-
ceeded, Daniel would have taken-and his covenant would have
applied to-not just the one-fifth interest he received as Nancy's heir,
but the entire disputed parcel. Fields' first theory was that because
Nancy once had been a potential Donation Act claimant with first
husband William Gillihan, she could not also claim with Daniel.97
But Gillihan had died in early 1850, before Congress passed the Dona-
tion Act, so Nancy could not have claimed as his wife.98 Second,
Fields contended, because the Lownsdale claim totaled less than 320
acres, the amount Daniel could have claimed alone as a single man, it
all should have gone to him. However, the policy of the law was to
give to husband and wife an equal quantity of land. A husband could
94. Squires, 9 F. Cas. at 36; accord Hall v. Russell, 101 U.S. 503 (1879).
95. Id. at 37.
96. Id. at 35. Deady seemed here to play Ophelia. His emphatic distinction (Nancy had only
a "qualified or determinable fee," whereas Isabella was "absolute owner") is simply
unpersuasive. Daniel, recall, inherited from Nancy the right to one fifth, purchased from Isabella
the right to a second, and later received both by the same patent "from the United States."
Moreover, Deady certainly failed to make clear why "justice and equity" favored purchaser
Fields on the first fifth but not the second. See infra note 102.
97. "[N]o person shall ever receive a patent for more than one donation of land in said
Territory in his or her own right." Donation Act, ch. 76, § 5, 9 Stat. 496, 498 (1850).
98. Accord Ford v. Kennedy, 1 Or. 166 (1855). Richard Chused has described an early
administrative practice permitting settler widows to claim land they would have received had
their husbands survived. Chused, supra note 26, at 10-12. Even so, Deady's ruling on this point
was certainly correct because Nancy, in fact, did not claim as Gillihan's widow.
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not "change the law and elect to take as a single man to the exclusion
of his wife."9 9
Fields claimed next that Daniel's declarations, together with long
acquiescence in Fields' possession and improvements, raised an "equi-
table estoppel in pais" barring any claim by the heirs. As in the levee
and schoolhouse cases, however, Deady was unreceptive:
This is a question of title--ownership of the soil, and not a mere ease-
ment or privilege. Titles would not be worth the paper upon which they
are written, if they could be called in question or destroyed in this
way-by the proof of stale parol declarations inconsistent with or in
opposition to them. 100
A more lax rule would offer a "bounty for frauds and perjuries."
Indeed, the "whole idea upon which this branch of the case rests is a
novelty and without authority of law." Oregon's adverse possession
period was twenty years, and possession even with improvements
short of that would not avail.101
Finally there was the 1864 state court judgment partitioning
Nancy's ninety acres, three-fifths to her children William, Millard,
and Ruth, and two-fifths (Daniel's and Isabella's) to Daniel's heirs and
grantees. Fields contended, somehow, that he thereby had acquired
"three other undivided fifths." In Deady's view, however, the parti-
tion decree had simply divided the ninety acres between two classes of
persons; it had not further divided the two-fifths portion among
Daniel's heirs and grantees. Purchaser Fields had "yielded nothing in
the partition and received nothing."" °  So, in an opinion again empha-
sizing security of land title, and a literal interpretation of the key 1850
covenant, Deady awarded purchaser Fields one-fifth of his land, the
fifth which Daniel had received as Nancy's heir from the United
States.
99. Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 33 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4776); accord Jette v. Priard, 4 Or.
296 (1872); cf Fitzpatrick v. Dubois, 9 F. Cas. 193 (C.C. Or. 1873) (No. 4842) (wife who left
husband's "bed and board"--and was divorced-prior to his Donation Act notification took
nothing).
Nor did Nancy take her half subject to the proprietors' deed to Chapman, regardless of
whether she had notice of it. A wife took Donation Act land "in her own right," statutory
language with the "express purpose of excluding the conclusion that she took in right of or
through her husband." Squires, 9 F. Cas. at 33; accord Carter v. Chapman, 2 Or. 93 (1864).
100. Squires, 9 F. Cas. at 40, 41.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id. at 38. Fields' argument perhaps was that the partition decree in legal effect had
placed within the oversized two-fifths sector all parcels Daniel had sold; therefore, the entire
disputed parcel was within that sector; and therefore, even under Deady's earlier conclusion
regarding the sources of Daniel's and Isabella's fifths, Daniel had received half the disputed
parcel "from the United States."
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In December 1871, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, sub
nom. Davenport v. Lamb. 1o3 Justice Stephen Field's"°4 opinion fol-
lowed Deady's reasoning closely on the crucial point that the proprie-
tors' 1850 covenant applied only to the one-fifth interest Daniel
Lownsdale had received, as Nancy's heir, from the United States:
[The proprietors] expected... to obtain ... the title of the United States
to lands in their possession .... They could not have intended, in case
their expectations were disappointed and the title passed from the
United States to other parties, to render it impossible for them to
acquire that title in all future time from those [other] parties without
being under obligation to instantly transfer it to the grantee or his suc-
cessors in interest.10
5
Davenport also contended on appeal that Donation Act language
granting a deceased spouse's share to her "survivor and children, or
heirs" gave a half share to the surviving spouse rather than the same
fraction each child received. Again, were that correct, Daniel's cove-
nant would have applied to the larger fraction. But granting a surviv-
ing spouse only a pro rata share seemed to the court both a more
natural interpretation and also one consistent with the "uniform ruling
of the courts, state and federal, in Oregon."'10 6
103. Davenport v. Lamb, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 418 (1872). The name change to the companion
Davenport case became even more confusing two years later when a second dispute between
granddaughter Emma Lamb and purchaser I.A. Davenport also reached the Supreme Court. See
Lamb v. Davenport, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 307 (1873); infra text accompanying notes 137-58. The
issues in Davenport I, however, were identical to those in Fields, each case involving half of Block
G in the Nancy Lownsdale tract, sold originally to W.W. Chapman in June 1850.
104. Field, whose circuit duties brought him regularly to Portland, had great respect for
Deady. In 1869 he strongly recommended Deady for the new circuit judgeship which eventually
went to California's Lorenzo Sawyer; he periodically designated Deady to preside over important
trials in San Francisco; several times he invited the Deadys to accompany him and Mrs. Field on
extended vacations; and, in 1890, reflecting on their long association, he wrote to Deady that the
"dignity with which you have presided for more than a quarter of a century" and the "ability
with which you have discharged the duties of the Judicial office" were "above all praise .. "
Letter from Field to Deady (June 2, 1890) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). On Field
generally, see C. MCCURDY, LAW OVER POLITICS: STEPHEN J. FIELD AND THE GROWTH OF
JUDICIAL POWER IN AMERICA (forthcoming 1988); C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD:
CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930).
105. 80 U.S. at 430. Such a literal interpretation would have been persuasive had a wholly
unrelated party obtained the original patent. It was much less so, however, where in fact the
proprietors' 1850 expectations had been realized almost precisely: the government had granted
the Lownsdale claim to Daniel and Nancy; and later the state court partition decree allocated the
disputed parcel to Daniel's heirs and assigns. Yet Deady, and then the Supreme Court, persisted
in the view that Daniel somehow had received four-fifths of the disputed land other than "from
the United States."
106. 80 U.S. at 428. A contrary conclusion would have created land-title chaos throughout
Nancy's west half of the claim, invalidating, for example, the eight-year-old state partition
judgment.
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Finally, as Deady had done, the Court peremptorily dismissed Dav-
enport's estoppel claim:
The parol evidence offered ... is entirely insufficient to create any
estoppel .... If the evidence of such declarations could be received
years after the death of the party who is alleged to have made them, to
control the legal title which has descended to his heirs, a new source of
insecurity in the tenure of property would be created, and heirs would
often hold their possessions upon the uncertain testimony of interested
parties .... 107
B. Lamb v. Starr (1868)
Deady himself reaffirmed his Fields ruling only months later in
Lamb v. Starr, 108 the first of several suits the nonresident heirs began
filing in his court.109 In April 1858, Lownsdale had conveyed to his
attorney Lansing Stout five entire blocks in Nancy's west half of the
claim, by quitclaim deed, pursuant to a secret "trust" by which Stout
was to sell the land and pay Lownsdale's debts. Eventually Lewis
Starr acquired one of the blocks, later paid $1533 owelty upon it, then
found himself defending a quiet title suit.110
Deady first overruled Starr's preliminary challenges to the petition.
He declined, for example, to apply an Oregon statute permitting only
one in possession to sue for partition. Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary
Act, directing federal courts to apply state law, governed only actions
at law; in equity, "general principles of equity jurisprudence" pre-
vailed, and they did not include a possession requirement for one seek-
ing a partition.11 Besides, Deady added, previewing his final decision,
the heirs were in possession, as tenants in conimon with Starr who was
entitled at most to the one-fifth interest which Daniel had power to
convey in 1858. The deed to Stout had been a "simple quitclaim with-
107. 80 U.S. at 431-32.
108. 14 F. Cas. 1024 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 8021); 14 F. Cas. 1030 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 8022).
109. 14 F. Cas. 1024.
110. Id.
11. 14 F. Cas. at 1030 (citing, inter alia, Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 272 (1851);
Russel v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 147 (1851)). Section 34 provided: "[T]he laws of the
several states... shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States .... The Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789). See generally Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 691-718 (P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler
2d ed. 1973); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49 (1923).
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out covenants," not even purporting to affect Daniel's after-acquired
interest. 112
A second plea by Starr contended that Isabella and William Gil-
lihan, Jr., were not Nancy's "children" for Donation Act purposes, so
Daniel had actually received (and conveyed to Stout) a third of her
claim rather than a fifth. Deady acknowledged that plea as "not with-
out plausibility," but could not so construe the Act without "doing
violence to its evident purpose and plain language."'"13 Nancy's
remarriage to Lownsdale "did not affect her identity or destroy the
parental relation between herself and the children which she bore
while called by the former name. '"114
Eight months later, Deady reached his final decision. Daniel's 1858
quitclaim deed to Stout conveyed only the one-fifth interest to which
he then was entitled as Nancy's surviving husband. Deady accepted
neither the heirs' contention that Starr had bought with notice of the
secret Lownsdale-Stout trust, so was entitled to nothing, nor Starr's
more persuasive contention that language in Daniel's deed assuring
"peaceable possession of the same to have and to hold . .. forever"
constituted a covenant estopping the heirs from any claim. "What
does 'the same' refer to?" he asked. "Surely the interest conveyed...
an undivided one fifth, and no more."1 1 To those inclined to criticize
such an implausible interpretation, Deady responded again with a con-
cluding reference to fairness:
Nor do I think that anyone concerned, unless it be the heirs of Daniel
H., has any right to complain of the result. The fifth which Starr, as an
112. Starr, 14 F. Cas. at 1030. Recall that in Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29 (C.C. Or. 1868)
(No. 4776), it was the covenant which eventually transferred a one-fifth interest to the purchaser;
here it was the 1858 deed, executed after Daniel had inherited his one-fifth fight from Nancy.
See supra text accompanying notes 91, 94.
113. Starr, 14 F. Cas. at 1027.
114. Id. Deady also overruled Starr's third plea and five grounds of demurrer. The plea was,
again, that Nancy took no part of the Lownsdale claim because she had been a potential claimant
with first husband Gillihan. Deady's rejoinder was, again, emphatic and convincing: Gillihan
could not have claimed because he died before September 1850, and even were that otherwise,
Nancy in fact had not claimed through Gillihan. Id. at 1028-29. Digressing, Deady lectured
Starr's attorney, former proprietor W.W. Chapman, for violating the court rule against multiple
pleas without leave of court. Id. at 1030.
The demurrers related solely to pleading requirements. Two demurrers, for example, invoked
an Oregon statute requiring any trust affecting real property to be written, but Deady, citing
treatises by Gould, Chitty, Story, and Smith, permitted the trust to be alleged "according to its
legal effect," requiring defendant to plead the statute. Id. at 1026.
115. Lamb v. Starr, 14 F. Cas. 1030, 1034 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 8022). Deady acknowledged
that his interpretation of the "peaceable possession" clause rendered it virtually meaningless. His
only response was that Lownsdale and Stout "'probably" had included the clause to assist Stout
in a threatened dispute over the land with the school district. Id.
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innocent purchaser, without notice of the trust, obtains, neither Daniel
H. or his heirs received any consideration for ....
On the other hand, this block being situated to the west of Park street,
there could have been no doubt, at the date of the deed from Daniel H.
to Stout that the property was within the wife's half, and that Daniel H.
had no other than a one-fifth interest in it. 1
16
C. Lamb v. Carter (1870); Lamb v. Burbank (1870); Lamb v.
Kamm (1870); Lamb v. Wakefield (1870)
In the summer of 1870, Deady wrote preliminary pleading decisions
in four more Lownsdale heir cases' 17 as purchasers and their attorneys
awaited the arrival of Circuit Judge Sawyer."8 Read together, the
opinions seem erratic, especially in tone, as Deady began to oscillate
between construing the early deeds narrowly to favor the heirs and
broadly to favor purchasers.
In Lamb v. Carter, Deady uncharacteristically sustained a demurrer
by purchasers of a block in Nancy's west half. Daniel had delivered a
bond for a deed to the disputed block in 1861, and the heirs naturally
asserted the principle of Lamb v. Starr-that purchasers Carter and
Smith were entitled only to what Daniel could convey in 1861, his own
fifth and the fifth he purchased from Isabella in 1860.
But Deady found an important difference. Daniel's 1861 bond
recited that he "sold, released and quitclaimed" the land and that if
paid the full price he would convey a "good and sufficient title to said
piece of land .... ,119 Deady interpreted thit language as a "contract
of sale, with an agreement or covenant ... to make title to the thing
sold.'"i2 ° While the sale language itself conveyed only Daniel's then
116. Id.
117. Lamb v. Carter, 14 F. Cas. 991 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8013); Lamb v. Burbank, 14 F. Cas.
989 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8012); Lamb v. Kamm, 14 F. Cas. 1014 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8017);
Lamb v. Wakefield, 14 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8024).
118. In late summer Deady telegraphed Sawyer that he was urgently needed in Portland to
hear the important case of Lamb v. Davenport, see infra text accompanying notes 137-58.
Sawyer was unavailable on the date requested, even though a "Mr. Starr" had called on him
personally to urge his early participation in yet another land case, Starr v. Stark see infra text
accompanying notes 159-85. Letter from Sawyer to Deady (Sept. 12, 1870) (Deady Papers,
Oregon Historical Society). Then in mid-October Sawyer wrote again, to say that "members of
the Portland bar" preferred him to preside at Portland beginning October 31 even if it meant
omitting the scheduled January term. He diplomatically assured Deady that they would preside
jointly over all such pending cases. Letter from Sawyer to Deady (Oct. 13, 1870) (Deady Papers,
Oregon Historical Society).
119. Lamb v. Carter, 14 F. Cas. 991, 992-93 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8013).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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two-fifths interest, the covenant language warranted a "good and suffi-
cient title, not merely to that interest but to said piece of land." 2
The heirs urged that a boilerplate phrase "according to these
presents" limited the covenant's operation to the two-fifths interest
then actually conveyed. This time, however, Deady saw it differently,
invoking the "plain intention of the parties": "It seems to me that this
would be to disregard the plain intention of the parties, as expressed in
the writing, and that, too, by giving a strained effect to a mere formal
phrase which was probably inserted in the instrument as a mere mat-
ter of form." 1 22 Daniel had sold the "piece of land" and upon final
payment was to convey "good and sufficient title."'
123
So the heirs lost altogether. Whereas in Starr Deady declined to
give the habendum clause meaning by applying it to the entire parcel,
in Carter the words "said piece of land" persuaded him to do so.
Whereas in Starr he emphasized common knowledge that Daniel had
inherited the right to only a small fraction of Nancy's west half, in
Carter he suggested that Daniel may have intended to acquire the
entire disputed parcel in a future partition. True, the pertinent deed/
bond language in the two cases differed somewhat, but, more funda-
mentally, in Carter Deady for the first time construed such language
according to the parties' "plain intention." Perhaps he heard Judge
Sawyer's footsteps.
The following month, in Lamb v. Burbank, Deady heard the first
dispute over land within Daniel's own east half of the claim. As in
Fields, the proprietors had conveyed the contested parcel to Chapman
individually in March 1850, by quitclaim deed, covenanting to transfer
any such future title obtained from the United States.
Deady reiterated his view that a pre-Donation Act deed conveyed
immediately no more than "bare possession." This time, however, the
proprietors' covenant for "further assurance" applied to the entire
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 994. The heirs also urged that a bond reference to "such further confirmation as
the title from the United States may vest in me" indicated that Daniel neither had, nor
necessarily expected to receive, title to the entire parcel. But Deady declined to engage in such
"conjecture," suggesting instead that Daniel, owner of two-fifths of Nancy's entire 90 acres,
perhaps had intended to "sell a small parcel thereof by metes and bounds . . . [and] in the
partition with his deceased wife's children . . . arrange to have such small parcel allotted to
himself in severalty." Id.
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parcel, not merely to a one-fifth interest Daniel took as Nancy's sur-
viving husband.124 So purchaser Burbank prevailed.
One week later, however, in Lamb v. Kamm, Deady again ruled for
the heirs, on very similar facts.125 Again in early 1850 the proprietors
had quitclaimed land to Chapman individually. The pertinent deed
language (illustrating again the primitive state of conveyancing in
early Portland) was "bargain, sell, and quitclaim ... as well in posses-
sion as expectancy." '126 Prominent Portlander Jacob Kamm'27 even-
tually acquired the land.
As before, Deady ruled that the phrase "bargain, sell, and quit-
claim" implied no covenant, either at common law or by statute.128
Kamm contended, however, that the word "expectancy" established
an intent to convey not only present possession but also any interest
the proprietors might later acquire. Deady disagreed. True, Black-
stone and others had described common-law "expectancy" estates,
principally "remainders" and "reversions." An essential attribute of
any such estate, however, was that it be "already vested" and simply
"take effect after another vested estate in the premises has been termi-
nated."' 2 9 The Portland proprietors in 1850 had had a "mere expecta-
tion" of acquiring a future estate, similar to that of a son who was
"heir apparent to his father" but whose deed conveyed nothing. 3 ' So,
for lack of a clearer covenant, purchaser Kamm lost all, even within
Daniel's east half.
Finally, in Lamb v. Wakefield, Deady returned to the result and
reasoning of Lamb v. Starr 3' to award the heirs four-fifths of a parcel
124. Lamb v. Burbank, 14 F. Cas. 989, 990-91 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8012); accord Bohlman
v. Coffin, 4 Or. 313 (1873) (proprietor Coffin bound by 1850 covenant for further assurances in
sale to Lownsdale).
125. 14 F. Cas. 1014 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8017).
126. Id. at 1015.
127. Kamm was a principal founder of Oregon Steam Navigation Company, which
monopolized early commercial and passenger traffic on the Columbia by controlling key
portages at the Cascades and The Dalles. The firm's considerable profits became cornerstones of
several early Portland fortunes, including Kamm's. See generally A. THROCKMORTON, OREGON
ARGONAUTS: MERCHANT ADVENTURERS ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER 247-76 (1961); 0.
WINTHER, THE OLD OREGON COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF FRONTIER TRADE, TRANSPORTATION
AND TRAVEL 173-76, 235-39 (1950); Johansen, The Oregon Steam Navigation Company: An
Example of Capitalism on the Frontier, 10 PAC. HIST. REV. 179 (1941).
128. Kamm, 14 F. Cas. at 1015.
129. Id.
130. Id. Nor did Kamm benefit from a similarly inartful covenant against claims by "any
person claiming through the grantors," language which amounted to a mere "special covenant of
non-claim," operating only upon the "estate which Daniel then had in the premises, which was
the bare possession." Id. at 1016 (citing W. RAWLE, supra note 91, at 222).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 108-16.
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in Nancy's west half. By then it was "too plain for argument" that
Daniel's original 1858 quitclaim deed itself conveyed only the "then
right, title and interest of said Daniel H.," an undivided one-fifth.'
32
And the exceptionally inartful "covenant," a "guarantee to warrant
and defend said lands to said [purchaser], his heirs and assigns forever,
against the lawful claims of all persons except the United States gov-
ernment or those claiming title from said government,"' 3 3 did not bar
the heirs' claim to the rest.1 34 It expressly excepted any claim by or
through the federal government, obviously the source of the heirs' pat-
ent, and in any event, fairly construed, it applied only to the one-fifth
interest conveyed:
The covenant is to warrant and defend such lands.., to said Hamilton,
etc. But by the premises of the deed only the right, title and interest of
Daniel H. is bargained and sold to Hamilton. It is a well settled rule of
law that the premises or granting clause of a deed may limit and control
the covenants, but the covenants can never enlarge the premises.'
35
Therefore, the covenant would not have barred Daniel himself from
asserting an after-acquired interest, and it certainly did not bar his
heirs from doing so.
Once again Deady acknowledged that his interpretation rendered
the covenant "practically a nullity and absurdity." 1 36 He steadfastly
refused, however, to accept the obvious inference, that the proprietors
had intended to warrant both present and future ("forever") title
excepting only the remote possibility that a stranger somehow would
receive the initial Donation Act patent. To exempt from the covenant
Lownsdale's own title acquired through the United States was, in
Deady's own word, extending literalism perilously close to
"absurdity."
132. Lamb v. Wakefield, 14 F. Cas. 1040, 1042 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8024).
133. Id. at 1041.
134. Id. at 1042.
135. Id. Deady's reasoning here is similar to that in Lamb v. Starr, 14 F. Cas. 1030 (C.C. Or.
1868) (No. 8022), supra text accompanying note 115, but contrasts sharply with that in Lamb v.
Carter, 14 F. Cas. 991 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 8013), supra text accompanying note 120.
The defendant purchasers in Wakefield included Henry W. Corbett, prominent Portland
banker and, from 1867 to 1873, United States senator. Deady commented revealingly about the
decision in his diary: "I am glad I am done with the case for I was obliged in obedience to the law
to make what is considered a hard ruling against my friends C[orbett] and W[akefield]." I
PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 19.
136. Wakefield, 14 F. Cas. at 1042.
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D. Lamb v. Davenport (1871)
In May 1871 Circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer 137 arrived in Portland
to preside with Deady over a pivotal case138 in the Lownsdale heirs
litigation. 39 His long, pro-purchaser opinion contrasted dramatically
with both the substance and the style of Deady's earlier rulings.
The original 1849 conveyance by Lownsdale and Coffin, of land
eventually within Daniel's east half, had been by quitclaim deed with a
covenant to "warrant and defend the same against all other persons
claiming the same through or by me or my heirs whatsoever."' Had
137. In 1869 Congress created circuit judgeships to lighten the workloads of Supreme Court
Justices. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, supra note 88. Deady was the early frontrunner for the Ninth Circuit appointment.
Justice Stephen Field strongly supported his candidacy, lobbying senators and organizing
support within the San Francisco bar. He wrote Deady, "[Y]ou are my candidate for the place in
our circuit and I have already increased support for you with some Senators.... I suggested that
a petition be quietly circulated asking your appointment." Letter from Field to Deady (Jan. 30,
1869) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). See generally supra note 104.
There were, however, two other candidates: Lorenzo Sawyer of the California Supreme Court,
formerly a student in Justice Noah Swayne's Columbus, Ohio law office; and Ogden Hoffman,
U.S. district judge for northern California. Their partisans reminded the Grant administration
of Deady's ruling in McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 8673), that a
military commander had improperly arrested a civilian for denouncing assassinated President
Lincoln. In Field's view, however, it was Hoffman's late endorsement of Sawyer which decided
the matter:
The defeat of Deady has given me much grief.... The McDowell decision was the point of
assault against Deady. Still I think Deady would have received the nomination but for one
circumstance.... [Alt the last moment while Deady was in the ascendant a telegram was
received from [the more senior] Hoffman by the President stating that he, Hoffman, would
be entirely satisfied to remain where he was in a district judgeship, provided Deady was not
advanced over him....
Letter from Field to G.E. Whitney (Dec. 16, 1869) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society).
So the President thereupon decided to send in Sawyer's name. Field nonetheless concluded that
"Deady has a great future.... His decision in the McDowell case does him honor." Id.
Hoffman confirmed his role to Deady, though urging that Deady not take it personally:
[C]andor obliges me to add that both I and my friends have frequently used the argument
that to bring a judge from another district and put him over my head here would be a
reflection upon if not an indignity to me.... Had you and Judge Sawyer's positions been
reversed I should have said the same.
Letter from Hoffman to Deady (Dec. 22, 1869) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). On
Hoffman generally, see Fritz, Judicial Style in California's Federal.Admiralty Court: Ogden Hoff-
man and the First Ten Years, 1851-1861, 64 S. CAL. Q. 1 (1982).
138. Lamb v. Davenport, 14 F. Cas. 996 (C.C. Or. 1871) (No. 8015), aff'd, 85 U.S. 307
(1873).
139. Again Harvey Scott described the circumstances:
Dr. Davenport was selected as the one against whom the complainants, or heirs at law,
should move, and by whose claims the equities in the case should be determined.... District
Judge M.P. Deady, of our city, most readily agreed to the suggestion that Judge Sawyer of
the United States Circuit Court should be present from San Francisco.
H. Scott, supra note 33, at 125-26. See generally supra note 68.
140. Davenport, 14 F. Cas. at 998.
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Deady heard the case alone, he almost certainly would have ruled for
the heirs. The 1849 sale conveyed only the proprietors' possessory
interest, and the covenant to warrant and defend "the same" extended
only to that interest.1
4
'
Sawyer, however, saw the matter very differently. In his view, the
"various contracts and conveyances" should be interpreted "in light of
the condition of things existing at the time, and with reference to
which they were executed."' 42 It was a "matter of public history" that
Oregonians, well before passage of the Donation Act, had anticipated
a federal land law which would recognize the "meritorious claims of
the pioneers" by granting a purchase right to the "first appropria-
tor." ' 43 Congress had established such systems elsewhere, and the
''common experience of mankind" made prior appropriation the "ori-
gin of all title.., in organized communities."'" So even a pre-1850
Oregon settler acquired an important land right, the "right of posses-
sion, [good] against everybody but the United States," transferable like
any other property right and "recognized by the law.., in all the new
states." 115
The "honest and most reasonable construction" of the various early
proprietor agreements seemed evident:
[I]t was the understanding of these parties, at all times, that they were to
procure title from the government to the whole tract, . . . but that they
were to have no interest, in their own right, in such lots as they, from
time to time, sold in pursuance of the original plan of establishing a
town. 1
4 6
The proprietors were to acquire title, but where lots had been sold it
would be title "for the benefit of the vendees."'
' 4 7
Several difficult questions remained, however. The first was, even
assuming such an "understanding," what legal theory permitted its
enforcement? Sawyer answered with language from the 1852 partition
agreement requiring each proprietor to "fulfill . . . all [prior] con-
tracts" relating to the Portland claim and, upon patent issue, to "make
141. The Davenport covenant language was almost identical to its counterparts in Burbank
and Kamm, which Deady had declared a mere "special covenant of non-claim" operating "only
upon the estate which Daniel H. then had in the premises, which was the bare possession." See
supra note 130.
142. Davenport, 14 F. Cas. at 999.
143. Id. at 999-1000.
144. Id. at 1000.
145. Id.
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good and sufficient deeds of general warranty for all lots ... which
may heretofore have been sold . . "148
But could a nonparty to the partition agreement, a purchaser,
enforce it? American law at that time generally precluded third-party
contract enforcement, 49 but in Sawyer's view once the proprietors
obtained title to the land their partition agreement became a trust,
whose beneficiaries did have enforcement rights. 5° Besides, denial of
such rights even to contract beneficiaries was among those "purely
technical principles, which have no application in courts of equity."1 51
Only one issue remained. Did the Donation Act itself invalidate the
1852 partition agreement as an impermissible "future contract" for
sale of a claim prior to patent? 152 Sawyer concluded that it did not,
that the partition had been simply a "further agreement prescribing
the details" of proprietor contracts predating the Donation Act.'53
Certainly purchasers of small Portland parcels, being mere "vendees
of portions of lands taken up by larger claimants," were not within the
prohibition's intent.'54 So, in sum, the proprietors' 1852 mutual cove-
nant to "make good and sufficient deeds" bound the Lownsdale heirs,
and purchaser Davenport prevailed.
Deady concurred, barely, in less than three pages:
148. Id. at 999. The partition agreement bound each proprietor to these duties by a $300,000
bond.
149. Early English and American courts refused to permit a nonparty to enforce a contract.
See, eg., T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 389-91 (2d ed. 1855); J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 353 (1796). By 1871 contrary authority had
begun to appear, eg., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), but most jurisdictions limited its
application to creditor beneficiaries. See, eg., Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N.Y. 233, 240 (1872); J.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 548-49 (1879);
Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L. REV. 1008 (1917-1918);
Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REv. 767 (1902); Annotation,
Right of Beneficiary to Enforce Contract Between Third Persons to Provide for Him by Will, 2
A.L.R. 1193 (1919).
150. Equity courts typically recognized an exception to nonparty enforcement disability for a
trust beneficiary suing a trustee. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 779A (1951); Williston,
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW Q. REV. 12 (1930). Eventually, the exception
became the rule. Corbin, supra note 149, at 1009.
151. 14 F. Cas. at 1004. Sawyer also declined to apply the "technical" common-law rule
precluding a trust in unowned property. Modem decisions had modified it somewhat, and in any
event "technical rules resting upon reasons that have no application to the circumstances of this
case, ought not to be too rigorously applied." Id. Moreover, by 1852 the proprietors had owned
estates sufficient to support a trust, for as Deady had ruled earlier, the 1850 Donation Act was a
present grant of a conditional fee. See, e.g., Chapman v. School Dist. No. 1, 5 F. Cas. 483 (C.C.
Or. 1865) (No. 2607); 5 F. Cas. 487 (C.C. Or. 1865) (No. 2608); supra text accompanying notes
69-82.
152. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
153. Lamb v. Davenport, 14 F. Cas. 996, 1006 (C.C. Or. 1871) (No. 8015).
154. Id. at 1005-06.
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After careful consideration, and not without some doubt and hesita-
tion, I have become satisfied that by force of the agreement of March 10,
1852, and the subsequent action of Lownsdale, Coffin and Chapman,
under and in pursuance of it, that each of them took and obtained from
the United States his separate portion of the land claim in trust for the
purchasers or their vendees of any lots situated therein, and before that
time sold by any or all of these parties.1 55
He devoted more than half his peremptory concurrence to questioning
various digressions by Sawyer into what Deady considered irrelevance
or even error.
1 56
Two years later, relying heavily on Sawyer's reasoning, the Supreme
Court affirmed.' 57 Justice Samuel Miller casually reviewed the several
early proprietor agreements, invoked the government's well-known
"disposition to protect the meritorious actual settlers," and concluded:
We are satisfied that by the true intent and meaning of these agreements
the equitable right to all the lots in controversy had been transferred by
Lownsdale ... before the passage of the Donation Act ....
According to well-settled principles of equity often asserted by this
court, Davenport is entitled to the conveyance of this title from those
heirs ....
IV. IT'S NEVER OVER 'TIL IT'S OVER: STARR v. STARK
The third cluster of Portland land claim litigation involved title to
portions of Ben Stark's northern forty-eight acres. Once again the
fundamental issue was priority between formal legal title, represented
this time by Stark's 1860 patent, and the equitable, possessory claims
of Portlanders who had bought and improved small parcels.
Encouraged by an early Supreme Court decision favoring Stark,
Deady again sustained the legal title claim; as before, however, Circuit
Judge Sawyer and the Supreme Court disagreed.
155. Id. at 1007.
156. E.g., whether individual lot holders contributed legally to acquisition of the land claim,
whether the original 1849 deed was from Lownsdale or Coffin, and whether Coffin had
reacquired the land briefly by redelivery of that deed to him. Id. at 1007-08.
157. Lamb v. Davenport, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 307 (1873).
158. Id. at 315. In early 1872 Sawyer returned to Portland to hear his final Lownsdale heir
dispute, Lamb v. Vaughn, 14 F. Cas. 1034 (C.C. Or. 1872) (No. 8023). His literalist, pro-heir
opinion, exhibiting even exasperation with certain of purchaser Vaughn's contentions, must have
startled his audience. Letters from Sawyer to Deady suggest, however, that Deady wrote both
Sawyer's opinion and his own concurrence in Vaughn. Letters from Sawyer to Deady (Dec. 18,
1871; Jan. 9, 1872) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). See also Mizner v. Vaughn, 17 F.
Cas. 543 (C.C. Or. 1872) (No. 9678).
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Recall that in January 1850, Lownsdale and Stark met in San Fran-
cisco and divided the Portland claim, allocating to Stark forty-eight
valuable acres subject to certain prior conveyances. 159 When Lowns-
dale returned to Portland, however, Coffin and Chapman refused to'
ratify that division unless Stark also confirmed three later sales, one
block to each proprietor individually. Captain John Couch, who held
Stark's power of attorney, eventually did so on his behalf.
Brothers Addison and Lewis Starr later bought three lots within the
block thus "sold" to Chapman, using and improving them for more
than a decade and, they alleged, receiving Stark's repeated assurances
that he recognized their priority. Uncertainties abounded, however,
and in 1860 city authorities countered Stark's patent application with
one of their own under the Townsite Act.1 60 The Public Land Office
responded by issuing simultaneous identical patents, excepting in each
all lawful claims by the rival applicant.
Four years later, in early 1864, the Starrs sued in state court to quiet
'title. They alleged two theories, a legal title through the city's patent
and an equitable title based on Stark's repeated assurances and long
acquiescence in their possession.' 61 In a classic instance of arcane pro-
cedure frustrating inquiry into the merits, the court ordered the Starrs
to elect between their two "inconsistent" theories. They chose to pur-
sue their legal title, and prevailed. The city's patent through which
they claimed was valid; Stark's was not because he had failed to reside
on and cultivate the land for the required four years. The Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed, in a brief opinion by Justice Boise which
ignored all the hard questions and cited no authority.'
62
Three years later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
reversed. Justice Field's opinion, perhaps even less satisfactory than
Boise's, concluded that the Starrs lacked standing to challenge Stark's
patent because they themselves had no adequate claim to the land. An
Oregon statute permitted anyone "in possession" to sue to quiet title.
However, mere "naked possession," according to Field, was inade-
159. See supra text following note 39.
160. On the 1844 Townsite Act, see supra notes 32, 62-63 and accompanying text.
161. Again W.W. Chapman represented the purchasers. For a preview of the eventual result,
see Coleman v. Stark, I Or. 115 (1854).
162. Starr v. Stark, 2 Or. 118 (1865), rev'd, 73 U.S. 402 (1868). One hard question ignored
was how the city patent could possibly be valid following the court'5 own 1854 decision, and
Deady's in 1861, that the Townsite Act did not even apply to Oregon when Portland was




quate: it had to be clothed with a "claim of right, that is, founded
upon title, legal or equitable."'' 63
The Starrs, of course, seemed to have just such a claim, recently
upheld by a unanimous Oregon Supreme Court. But Field and his
colleagues did not agree. As Deady had held in Lownsdale, " the
Townsite Act did not apply to Oregon until well after settlement of
Portland. So the city's patent was invalid; the Starrs' legal title was
defective, therefore not a "claim of right"; and they were not "in pos-
session," hence unable to challenge Stark's patent. That reasoning
chain made "unnecessary" any inquiry into Stark's own "original set-
tlement and residence." '65 So it seemed in 1868 that Ben Stark had
won.
The Starrs declined to vacate, however, and a year later Stark sued
in Deady's court for ejectment. Lewis Starr, by then sole owner of the
lots, defended by alleging an "equitable title," a defense Deady
ordered stricken as "immaterial and frivolous": such a title, even if
established, was "no defense to an action for possession by the holder
of the legal title."1 66 The Supreme Court already had decided the
legal title issue, so Deady's only remaining task was to calculate the
damages due Stark for Starr's long unlawful possession. Threading his
way gracefully through much accumulated evidence, he finally deter-
mined the lost rental value, minus taxes Starr had paid and the value
of Starr's permanent improvements, to be $1962. 167
163. Stark v. Starr, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 402, 410 (1868). Recall that one month later Deady
would decline to apply the same statute to the Lownsdale heir partition suit against Starr. See
supra note Ill and accompanying text.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. Field quoted and praised "Mr. Justice
Deady," see Stark, 73 U.S. at 415-17, and sent Deady a copy of his opinion. Letter from Field to
Deady (Apr. 20, 1868) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). Regrettably, Field destroyed
all Deady's letters to him so we cannot know what, if anything, Deady had written to him about
the case or about the Portland land claim generally.
165. Stark, 73 U.S. at 414-19.
166. Stark v. Starr, 22 F. Cas. 1084, 1085 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 13,307).
167. Id. at 1086-91. Whether Starr could recoup the $2000 value of his improvements was
difficult. An Oregon statute authorized recovery only for improvements made while holding
"under color of title adversely to the claim of the plaintiff, in good faith." Id. at 1085. Therefore,
the Supreme Court decision denying Starr standing to challenge Stark's patent seemed plainly to
deny his improvements counterclaim as well.
Deady chose to ignore Field's opinion, however, invoking instead other authorities holding
that "[a]ny instrument having a grantor and grantee ... gives color of title." His review of the
deeds extending from Chapman to Starr convinced him that, yes, Starr had improved the land
while holding "under color of title." Starr also had held adversely to Stark, and in good faith.
Adverse possession was among the "vexed questions of the law," but the "just and reasonable
rule" was that "every possession is presumed to be rightful and therefore adverse to the title of
any other claimant." Starr's "exclusive possession ... without any recognition of [Stark's] title"
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But Starr persisted still, perhaps buoyed by references in Deady's
opinion to his own good faith and to Stark's repeated assurances.
Rather than leave, he sued, alleging again the equitable title theory he
and his brother had involuntarily abandoned six years earlier. Once
more he asked Deady to compel Stark to convey legal title.
But again Deady declined to hear the equitable theory. "After delib-
erate consideration, I am well satisfied that the former adjudication
between these parties is a bar to this suit....""1 6  The state court order
to elect had been an "adjudication that one or the other of these causes
of suit was insufficient, because, in the nature of things, itwas impossi-
ble that both could be true in fact and law.. . ." Further, the Starrs'
election had been "in the nature of a solemn admission" that the aban-
doned equitable title theory was "not well founded in fact or law, or
both." '16 9 Deady offered the usual rationale for res judicata, that a
party not be permitted to "harass and weary" another with multiple
suits, then applied it to Starr:
After years of litigation, the judgment of the court of last resort was
given in [Stark's] favor, and now the plaintiffs seek to compel him to
submit to a re-adjudication of his claim upon a fragment of the former
suit, which was lost and abandoned by the plaintiffs in the progress of
the former trial. 7
Starr answered the bell for yet another round, however, by changing
attorneys' 7 ' and appealing to Judge Sawyer. Four years later, follow-
ing a full trial, Sawyer wrote an opinion emphatically reversing not
only Deady's res judicata ruling but the Starr brothers' entire series of
losses extending back to the 1868 Supreme Court decision.
First, the prior state court action did not bar Starr's equitable title
theory. It was "quite clear" to Sawyer that the original order compel-
ling the Starrs to elect was "erroneous." Facts supporting the two the-
ories were "entirely consistent with each other"; only the legal
qualified for the presumption. And finally, his "actual belief" in his "apparent title" satisfied the
good faith requirement. Id. at 1086-89.
168. Starr v. Stark, 22 F. Cas. 1113, 1114-15 (C.C. Or. 1870) (No. 13,316), rev'd, 22 F. Cas.
1116, 1121 (C.C. Or. 1874) (No. 13,317), aff'd 94 U.S. 477 (1877).
169. Id. at 1115.
170. Id. The Starrs, of course, had not "lost and abandoned" their equitable-title theory
voluntarily, but by a trial court order which neither appellate court bothered to review. The
Oregon Supreme Court understandably did not review the order when affirming the Starrs'
judgment, but why the United States Supreme Court, reversing, failed to consider it is a mystery.
171. Starr, previously represented by Chapman, hired J.N. Dolph and William Effinger,




conclusions to be drawn diverged.1 72 Moreover, even had the election
order been correct, obviously it had precluded the Starrs from litigat-
ing their equitable claim. Sawyer asked, then answered, a compelling
question:
Does it lie in Stark's mouth now, after procuring such a ruling, and
forcing plaintiffs against their protest, under the order of court, to omit
one cause of action, to say that plaintiffs might have litigated the claim
in that action, and, because they did not, must now be precluded? I
think not. 173
On the merits, Sawyer brushed aside Stark's series of technical chal-
lenges to various contracts and deeds,1 74 emphasizing again "sur-
rounding circumstances" and the parties' "true intent": "Like other
contracts of that time relating to the lands in Portland, the language of
these various instruments is doubtless open to much criticism. But...
we must consider them in the light of the situation of the parties, and
condition of things which gave them birth."'' 75  No "unprejudiced
mind" could examine the evidence and fail to conclude that "Stark
fully acquiesced in and adopted" the January 1850 contract with
Lownsdale, as modified by Coffin, Chapman, and Couch. Specifically,
it was "manifest" that Stark had "held out by his acts and express
declarations . . . to complainant and his brother . . . unmistakable
assurances ... that if he obtained his patent to the general claim he
would convey to them the lots they had purchased."' 176  Sawyer
directed him to do so, in "strict accordance with... intrinsic justice":
I am glad to be able to say that I am fully satisfied, as I think any rea-
sonable mind must be, that the result in this case, and in the several
others argued in conjunction with it... is in strict accordance with the
172. Starr v. Stark, 22 F. Cas. 1116, 1121 (C.C. Or. 1874) (No. 13,317), aff'd, 94 U.S. 477
(1877). See also Starr v. Stark, 22 F. Cas. 1131 (C.C. Or. 1874) (No. 13,318); Failing v. Stark, 22
F. Cas. 1130 (C.C. Or. 1874); Kamm v. Stark, 14 F. Cas. 104 (C.C. Or. 1871) (No. 7604).
173. Starr, 22 F. Cas. at 1122. Sawyer neatly turned the res judicata argument, suggesting
that the state court ruling of inconsistency was itself res judicata that "'the cause now relied on
could not have been litigated in the former action." Id. at 1123. Presumably, however, Stark's
real contention was (or should have been) that the Starrs failed to cross-appeal the election order
to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 1122-23.
174. E.g., that Captain Couch had lacked authority to modify Stark's January 1850
agreement with Lownsdale, and that the proprietors' 1850 joint deed to Chapman was ineffective.
See id. at 1123-28.
175. Id. at 1124.
176. Id. at 1124-28. Sawyer also invoked, for good measure, the Supreme Court's Lamb v.
Davenport dictum that even a pre-Donation Act contract or quitclaim deed could transfer
equitable rights against a grantor who later acquired title. In his view, Starr's title from Stark
was *'in every particular, equal to that of Davenport from Lownsdale." Id. at 1130; see also
supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
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intrinsic justice of the case. In my apprehension, any other result in
these cases would work great hardship and gross injustice.177
Deady dissented quietly, in six lines. He disagreed, of course, "as to
the bar of the former proceedings" and equally "as to the effect of a
conveyance.., without covenants... by the donee under the dona-
tion act ... prior to the passage of that act."17 Generally, however,
he chose not to answer Sawyer's thirty-five page opinion which both
reversed his ruling and admonished that no "unprejudiced mind"
could fail to see its "gross injustice." He chose instead to await word
from Washington.
When that word arrived two years later, it brought no comfort. Ste-
phen Field wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court affirming both Saw-
yer's decision and his rhetoric.179 He first agreed that the state court
litigation, begun twelve years earlier and decided eventually by the
Supreme Court, was not res judicata precluding Starr's equitable title
claim. Undoubtedly a party had to present together "all the grounds
upon which he expects a judgment in his favor," but not "distinct
causes of action.., each of which would authorize by itself independ-
ent relief. . . ."10 Citing not a single authority, nor even helpfully
analyzing the facts before him, Field simply concluded on this issue:
A decision upon one could not possibly be a bar to proceedings upon the
other, from their intrinsically distinct nature. Having required the com-
plainants to proceed in that suit only upon one cause or ground for
relief, the court left the other cause open for any future suit which they
might choose to bring.
81
Field also adopted Sawyer's view of the merits, emphasizing the
need to interpret early Portland land contracts in light of the "condi-
tion on which land in Oregon was held at that time." Because consid-
erable settlement had preceded extension of American law to the
region, early settlers had necessarily bought and sold less than full
titles to their land. However, even under their own provisional land
law, those settlers had "acted upon a confident expectation that their
possessions and improvements would be respected by the government,
177. Starr, 22 F. Cas. at 1130.
178. Id. Privately, Deady defended his several pro-Stark rulings this way:
Sat in the [circuit court] and closed Stark cases.... I suppose the plaintiffs ought to have
the lots, but I don't see my way clear to make a decree in their favor and obey the law. Still
I suppose most of the testimony of the Starts, Chapman and Coffin is substantially false.
1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 127.
179. Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477 (1875).
180. Id. at 485.
181. Id. at 486.
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and that ultimately they should acquire the title." '82 In turn, an
"unwritten conventional law" of land sales had emerged: "It was,
therefore, understood by the people that, whenever the legal title was
thus obtained, it should inure to the benefit of the grantees of the
claimant who secured the patent of the United States." '183 As the
Court had concluded earlier in Lamb v. Davenport, even a pre-Dona-
tion Act purchaser acquired "as against his vendor, an equitable right
to the land ... 184
Field then reviewed the record in Stark, reiterating Sawyer's conclu-
sions that the proprietors' 1850 conveyance to Chapman was valid,
transferring an "equitable right to call for a release of the legal title";
that Stark had agreed to the modification of his January 1850 contract
with Lownsdale, both through his agent Couch and later by his own
conduct; and that the various deeds to Starr had transferred to him the
equitable right. Noting that Starr and his brother, relying on Stark's
assurances, had used and improved the land as their own for several
years, Field concluded with a sentence which must have stunned
Deady: "Upon every principle of law and morals, [Stark] should be
forever enjoined from the commission of such injustice, and be com-
pelled to quiet the title of the complainant by a release of all claim to
the premises."' 185
182. Id. at 487.
183. Id. Field tried here to soften the blow to Deady by a footnote commending the
"observations of Mr. Justice Deady, of the United States District Court, on this subject, quoted
in Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 415 ... Id.
184. Id. at 488.
185. Id. at 492. Portland, of course, was not the only site of early Donation Act disputes.
For a similar, though briefer and less revealing, series of decisions involving the Salem land claim
of William and Chloe Willson, see Wythe v. Smith, 30 F. Cas. 771 (C.C. Or. 1876) (No. 18,122)
(purchaser's estoppel plea rejected: the "seductive plea of promoting justice in particular cases
[would] leave the right to real property to rest upon ... uncertain and prejudiced testimony of
ignorant and interested witnesses to . . . casual, stale and parol acts and declarations . . .");
Wythe v. City of Salem, 30 F. Cas. 770 (C.C. Or. 1876) (No. 18,121) (pleas of public dedication
and res judicata upheld); Wythe v. Palmer, 30 F. Cas. 769 (C.C. Or. 1875) (No. 18,120) (Field,
with dissent by Deady: settler who was "entitled to a patent" after four years residence able to
convey parcels prior to receipt of patent); Wythe v. Myers, 30 F. Cas. 766 (C.C. Or. 1876) (No.
18,119) (three purchaser defenses ordered stricken; purchaser's attorney J. Quinn Thornton
lectured); Wythe v. Haskell, 30 F. Cas. 762 (C.C. Or. 1876) (No. 18,118) (patent certificate, and
not patent itself, used to determine east-west line between spouses' respective halves); Nicklin v.
Wythe, 18 F. Cas. 221 (C.C. Or. 1874) (No. 10,253) (Sawyer and Deady: land received by
husband in exchange for land within wife's half of claim subject to resulting trust in her favor).
For a critique of Smith, see Chused, supra note 26, at 29-33. See generally J. Thornton, Salem
Titles: History of the Title to Real Estate in Salem, in SALEM DIRECTORY-1874.
At The Dalles, the issues were different. The 1848 Oregon Territorial Act granted to religious
societies up to 640 acres per site then "occupied as missionary stations among the Indian Tribes."
Oregon Territorial Act, ch. 177, § 1, 9 Stat. 323 (1848). In Dalles City v. Missionary Society, 6 F.
356 (D. Or. 1879), Deady ruled for the city and three private plaintiffs (including former and
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V. CONCLUSION
Matthew Deady's public land law decisions touch and concern sev-
eral important themes of early far-west history. They recall for us
again the importance of America's vast public domain to its nine-
teenth-century experience, particularly in the West. The new begin-
nings for hardy settlers who survived the land's adversities helped
reinforce for all Americans values to which we lay special patriotic
claim-freedom, opportunity, equality, democracy. Deady's decisions
also illustrate once again the "central role which law played in the
history of American public lands."186 The actions of Congress, federal
administrators, and federal and state judges could hardly have been
more prominent in shaping the settlement, ownership, and land use
patterns within public land states. 187 Further, the decisions reviewed
here illustrate a central, abiding tension in early federal land policy,
between aid to speculator claimants and protection of actual set-
tlers.188 Although collectively the Portland proprietors were more
than mere speculators, (all but Stark lived in the city and contributed
materially to its development), the speculator-settler tension is plainly
evident in the litigation arising from their Donation Act claims. And
finally, related more closely to Deady himself, the decisions offer
insight into the difficult choices, common to judges in a new land,
between older, imported legal principles and newer, indigenous rules
conforming more closely to local attitudes and conditions.1 89
Although Deady plainly favored older, established principles, the
related decisions by Judge Sawyer and the Supreme Court support
Paul Gates' observation that the development of American public land
law was, in important part, a movement "from the common law doc-
future Oregon chiefjustices) that the Methodist missionaries had "abandoned" their site at The
Dalles by 1847 so took nothing by the 1848 act. He noted in his diary: "Put a great deal of work
on the case for which the losers will not like me and the winner will not thank me." 1 PHARISEE,
supra note 9, at 290. At least the Supreme Court approved, however. Missionary Society v.
Dalles City, 107 U.S. 336 (1883). See generally Knuth, "Picturesque" Frontier The Army's Fort
Dalles, 67 OR. HIsT. Q. 293 (1966); Shackelford, The Methodist Mission Claim to The Dalles
Town Site, 16 OR. HIsT. Q. 24 (1915).
186. Reid, Legal History, in 1963 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 681, 688. 1
187. See generally works cited supra note 2.
188. See, e.g., H. TATTER, THE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF THE ACTUAL SETTLER IN
THE PRIMARY DISPOSITION OF THE VACANT LANDS IN THE UNITED STATES TO 1841 (1979);
Gates, The Role of the Land Speculator in Western Development, 66 PA. MAG. OF HIsT. & BIOG.
314 (1942), reprinted in P. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS, supra note 2, at 48.
189. See, eg., G. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUI&TAIN
FRONTIER 10-17 (1983); Blume & Brown, Territorial Courts and Law, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39, 467
(1962-1963); Langum, Introduction, Symposium on Law in the West, J. WEST (Jan. 1985).
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trine of property rights ... to ... the rights of occupants ... if they
could prove some color of title."' 9 °
Matthew Deady's own public land law jurisprudence emphasized
security of legal title, preservation of common-law conveyancing rules
undiluted by parol exceptions, and literal interpretations of contract
and deed language. Although sensitive at times to the claims of jus-
tice, Deady's greater allegiance was to a more jealous mistress, the
law, as he understood and esteemed her. If in conflict, the equitable
claims of purchaser litigants simply had to yield before society's
greater need for neutral, enduring legal principles, applied without
fear or favor. To state it more simply, faced with a recurring tension
between formalism and fairness in early far-west public land law litiga-
tion, Deady repeatedly chose formalism.
The contrast between Deady's views and those of others who adju-
dicated Portland land claim disputes was often striking. In the levee
litigation, the territorial supreme court heralded "natural justice" and
"equity and good conscience" in deciding twice that various early pro-
prietors had dedicated the waterfront to public use. Deady, enforcing
instead the paper-title rights of private claimants, invoked traditional
"solemnities and formalities" of lawful real property transfers.'"' In
virtually all the Lownsdale heir cases, Deady applied textbook com-
mon-law conveyancing doctrines, construed covenant language nar-
rowly, and declined to recognize any alleged estoppel arising from
mere conduct or "stale parol declarations." Without such protection,
he warned repeatedly, land titles would not be "worth the paper upon
which they are written." By contrast, Judge Sawyer and later the
Supreme Court stressed the "honest and reasonable construction" of
early proprietor agreements and overcame technical enforcement
objections by an imaginative use of trust doctrine.' 92 Finally, in the
Stark litigation, Deady ruled again for the legal title claimant, on the
highly disputable ground of res judicata. Sawyer and the Supreme
Court, reversing, emphasized again the parties' early conduct and
understandings and the "intrinsic justice" of their respective
positions. ' 9
3
The choices Deady faced in much of the Portland land litigation
created for him what the late Robert Cover described as a moral-for-
190. Gates, Tenants of the Log Cabin, 49 MIss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 31 (1962), reprinted in
P. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS, supra note 2, at 13.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 49-68.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 87-158.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 163-85.
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mal dilemma.194 A generation earlier, Joseph Story, Lemuel Shaw,
and other antebellum judges had struggled to reconcile personal com-
mitments to human freedom with professional fidelity to constituted
authority. Deady's dilemma, though less tragic, was no less real. In
"obedience to the law" he was obliged to make "hard rulings." Espe-
cially in private, he lamented repeatedly the "conflict between law and
the popular interest and opinion of what is right. ...
Occasionally Deady denied facing such a dilemma, invoking as jus-
tification both "well settled rules of law" and "equity and justice." 196
More commonly, however, he exhibited "dissonance-reducing behav-
ior" virtually identical to that which Cover described. He elevated the
formal stakes by claiming, for example, that "certainty of title to real
property [is] ... among the most important objects of... any civilized
community." He retreated toward a mechanical formalism, conclud-
ing that it was a "well settled rule of law that the premises ... may...
limit the covenants, but the covenants can never enlarge the prem-
ises." And he ascribed responsibility elsewhere, usually to the cove-
nant drafters whose work he described more than once as "practically
a nullity and absurdity."'1 97 Moreover, Deady's occasional, implausi-
ble denials of any moral-formal dilemma were themselves, in part, a
form of dissonance-reducing behavior.
My own final judgment of Deady's public land law decisions is rela-
tively critical. Without question, Deady's paramount professional val-
ues-legalism, respect for constituted authority, and a cautious,
common-law approach to legal conflict-have been justly celebrated
features of the American legal experience. Many of his public land
law decisions, however, including notably those adjudicating the Port-
land land claim, seem to have exalted those values unnecessarily at the
expense of competing fairness considerations.
In retrospect, Deady overestimated the threat to secure land titles,
and to the rule of law generally, in the difficult Portland cases. Judge
Sawyer saw the cases more accurately as largely sui generis, mere
growing pains of a frontier community, unlikely to recur, and best
resolved by flexible, fact-oriented decisions. Traditional policies favor-
ing relatively formalistic judging-certainty, predictability, non sub
homine sed sub lege-were, it seems, considerably less compelling in
194. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND -THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 226-56
(1975).
195. 1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 18, 19 (emphasis in original); see also supra note 178.
196. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 82, 95.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 135, 136. See generally R. COVER, supra note
194, at 229-38.
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the Portland cases than Deady believed. Indeed, one might even con-
tend a century later that Deady's formalism undermined rather than
enhanced security of land title, for certainly his decisions confounded
rather than conformed to prevailing contemporary beliefs regarding
entitlements to the disputed land.
How then does one account for Deady's decidedly formalist, ulti-
mately mistaken view of the Portland land claim litigation? What
deeper concerns underlay his fidelity to the law as he understood it,
even at the expense of the public and purchasers who, in his own
words, "ought to have the lots"?
Here and there one finds hints that personalities may have played a
part. Deady clearly had little use for W.W. Chapman, proprietor,
likely drafter of slovenly covenants, and eventually the attorney for
many purchasers. Deady's diary references to Chapman are uni-
formly unfavorable, describing him as "selfish," "foolish," and an "old
white haired Charon." Deady ridiculed Chapman's "old stereotyped
story of the settlement and customs of this town" and his "parol his-
tory of the growth and origin of titles to property in Portland. ... " I
Reading Sawyer's Vaughn opinion, Deady remarked gleefully that
"Old Chap[man] will howl." '99
By contrast, Deady generally admired Ben Stark. Both had been
pro-slavery Democrats during territorial years, and many believed
that it was Deady who persuaded Governor John Whiteaker to
appoint Stark to the Senate in 1861.2" In his state court litigation
against the Starrs, Stark actually called Deady as a residence wit-
ness, 20 1 and, following his return to Connecticfit, he and Deady con-
tinued to correspond warmly and exchange photographs. Indeed, on
the same page of Deady's 1871 diary appear these two entries: "Sent
Ben Stark my photograph in exchange for his received some time
since." "In Circuit Court tried Stark vs Starr and Stark vs Bacon et
al, without a jury. 2 2
198. 1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 10, 21, 200 (emphasis in original). Charon ferried souls
across the river Styx.
199. Id. at 69. On Lamb v. Vaughn, 14 F. Cas. 1034 (C.C. Or. 1872) (No. 8023), see supra
note 158. For a memorable altercation between Chapman and Deady's early political ally,
district judge O.C. Pratt, see G. BELKNAP, supra note 51, at 50 (quoting Oregon Spectator, Nov.
11, 1851); Teiser, First Associate Justice of Oregon Territory: O.C. Pratt, 49 OR. HIST. Q. 171, 181
(1948); Letter from Pratt to Deady (Oct. 8, 1851) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society).
200. See supra note 36.
201. Deposition of Hon. M.P. Deady, Stark v. Starr, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 402 (1868). See
generally supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
202. 1 PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 2. Stark also took time repeatedly to praise Deady for
presiding over the "one Court in Oregon that was not organized to sanctify robbery." Letter
Matthew Deady and Federal Public Land Law
A second partial explanation one might infer from the opinions is
that Deady was simply less careful than he needed to be in his early
public land decisions, that he followed his initial formalist instincts
and later felt unable to inquire more deeply into the merits of cases
without confessing error. Almost certainly he did underestimate the
appellate scrutiny his public land rulings would receive, relying, it
seems, on his typically near-final authority on matters relating so
decidedly to Oregon alone. Judge Sawyer and Justice Field made the
difficult circuit journey to Portland as infrequently as possible, the
Supreme Court was far away, and Deady's great ability and dedication
assured him an unusual measure of deference even on appeal. In the
Portland land claim cases, however, litigants repeatedly appealed
beyond his court, and his strongly formalist views of those cases were
sometimes simply too extreme to be sustained.
In the end, however, neither personalities nor early lack of care ade-
quately explains Deady's public land decisions. Throughout his career,
both on and off the bench, Deady's moral posture was rigidly upright
and free from personal influence. Even his critics acknowledged an
unusually well developed set of scruples.20 3 Moreover, many of his
Lownsdale-heir rulings favored two Kentucky grandchildren wholly
unknown to him, at the expense of Portland "friends" like Senator
Henry Corbett and L.H. Wakefield. 2°  And finally, the lack of care/
overconfidence suggestion fails even to inquire into the sources or
strength of Deady's initial formalist instincts.
The most fundamental explanation-the one central to an under-
standing of Matthew Deady as judge and person-recalls once again
Deady's unusually strong belief in law as the foundation, and judges as
guardians, of moral, civilized society. Elsewhere I suggested that
Deady's outspoken defenses of beleaguered Chinese immigrants drew
inspiration in part from his strong commitment to reason, law, and
order in a time of perceived political demagoguery and social disinte-
from Stark to Deady (Nov. 24, 1866) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society); see also letter
from Stark to Deady (May 25, 1885) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society).
203. Former territorial court colleague George Williams, for example, eulogized Deady in
this way:
There were some things about Judge Deady that I did not particularly admire, but there
was one thing about him that commanded my highest admiration; there was no sign or taint
of the demagogue about him. He was independent and fearless. He was unmoved by
popular prejudice or public censure. . . . He had the courage to make his judgments
according to his convictions. I know of no higher praise that I can bestow upon a judge
than to say of him that he administered the law without fear, favor or affection.
Proceedings and Eulogies in the United States Circuit and District Courts for the District of
Oregon 6 (Apr. 1, 1893) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
204. See supra note 135.
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gration.2 °5 The beliefs and attitudes inspiring his public land law deci-
sions, though less apparent, were very similar.
Both in public and in private Deady constantly contrasted the law,
especially the common law, with the partisan, irrational, often corrupt
world of politics. To him, the core values of enlightened civilization,
including the special Anglo-American sensitivity to political and eco-
nomic freedoms, depended substantially on maintaining the integrity
of fundamental legal principles.2"6 Security of land titles, resting in
part on immutable common-law conveyancing rules, was among the
most important of those principles.
Holding such values paramount, Deady was consciously within a
distinguished tradition of American thought reaching back at least to
the constitutional ratification debates. Alexander Hamilton was
among his principal heroes,20 7 and he undoubtedly agreed as well with
many of the social and legal views of other early Federalists like Rich-
205. Mooney, supra note 9, at 633-37.
206. To the people who speak the English tongue, the common law is... the wisdom of
their ancestors..., at once a tradition and a living inheritance. Its principles, maxims, and
aphorisms enter into and give tone and color to our morals, politics, and literature .... [It]
furnishes at once the bulwark and limit of the rights of person and property, and of
government and subject or citizen.
M. Deady, supra note 44, at 18; see also supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. To borrow
Karl Llewellyn's memorable phrase, Deady was one who sang often "in praise of Our Lady of
the Common Law." To formal style masters like Deady, it was "a good judge's business to steel
himself against emotion, and against deflection by ... sense of justice which may run counter to
'the law'. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 38-39. See generally id. at 35-40, 64-74,
186-89.
207. As early as January 1862 Deady described how he had grown beyond the "generous but
unthinking impulses" of his Democratic youth to become "more of a Federalist of the
Washington and Hamilton school, than a disciple of the Sans Culotte philosophy of Jefferson."
Letter from Deady to Jesse Applegate (Jan. 8, 1862) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society).
See generally Mooney, supra note 9, at 633. For the next two decades Deady repeatedly praised
Washington and Hamilton as America's supreme patriots. Orations by Matthew P. Deady (July
4, 1877), (July 4, 1885) (Deady Papers, Oregon Historical Society). On Hamilton generally,
including his commitments to federalism and rule of law, see S. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL
AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ARCHITECTS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 120-45 (1964)
("The Security of Property"); J. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX
(1959); G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
56-63 (1970) (describing Hamilton's 1784 "Phocion" essays as among the "most notable
documents of American constitutionalism").
Matthew Deady and Federal Public Land Law
ard Peters, Samuel Chase, James Kent,2"' and the legendary Joseph
Story.20
9
It was in Deady's own postwar era, however, that many elite law-
yers and their clients began to perceive even more urgently the need
for strict rule of law. The age of enterprise produced heightened class
conflict in America, increasing fear among professional and business
leaders of "restless majorities upsetting the social order and the rights
of property. '21  For many, the preferred legal response was rededica-
tion to a "new judicialism" to maintain an "ordered society in a world
where the forces of popular democracy might become unmanage-
able. 21 1 Relatively rigid legal categories and an activist judiciary to
refine and enforce them seemed to be the nation's best potential break-
water against rising tides of political turmoil and social revolution.212
Matthew Deady both shared the elite concern and believed in the pre-
ferred response. He occasionally criticized Portland's business elite
for its notable lack of civic virtue, but he certainly disliked and dis-
trusted far more the ill-mannered "demagogues" and working-class
"mob" gaining political power in his community.213
208. See, eg., J. HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM (1939); G. WHITE,
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 35-63 (1976); Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard
Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 26
(1978); Presser & Hurley, Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase, 1984 U.
ILL. L.F. 771. See generally P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 99-265 (1965).
209. Story, of course, began his career as a Republican politician, but he, like Deady, changed
more than simply his profession. See, eg., R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH
STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 37-72 (1985). Ten years of practicing both politics
and law led Story to "two indelible impressions"-that politics was "inefficient, if not immoral
[and] quite unable to guide the American people safely through the troubled age"; and that law,
"administered by lawyers and judges, was a corrective ... and possibly even an alternative" to
party government. Id. at 38. "Over the art of politics and the artful dodging of the demagogue,
Story chose the science of the law." Id. at 63.
210. A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 233 (1960).
211. Id. at 3, 5.
212. Duncan Kennedy is the principal expositor of this development in American legal
thought. See, eg., Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding ofLegal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND
SOCIOLOGY 3 (S. Spitzer ed. 1980); see also M. HORWITZ, supra note 12, at 253-66 (1977); C.
JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); R. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 72-126 (1951); Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in The
Age ofAmerican Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN
AMERICA (G. Geisan ed. 1983).
One particularly notable incarnation of such classical formalism, particularly later in his
career, was Deady's mentor and friend Justice Stephen Field. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra; C.
MCCURDY, supra note 104; McCurdy, Justice Field and The Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters ofLaissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM.
HisT. 970 (1975).
213. In an 1883 address entitled "Towns and Cities," for example, Deady urged that the
municipal franchise be limited to taxpaying property owners. Most city governments, in his
Washington Law Review
There is also a more personal dimension to this aspect of Deady's
thought. Beginning in his middle years Deady became, I think, an
increasingly lonely, melancholy man. Shortly after ascending the
bench, he discarded the gregarious, corn-whiskey, political persona of
his youth for an austere, teetotaling judicial demeanor both on and off
the bench.2 14 His earlier close friends like Asahel Bush and James
Nesmith gradually drifted away, both physically and spiritually, never
to be replaced. Neither his wife, the highly proper Lucy Henderson,
nor any of his three sons was a true soulmate.2 15
That abiding sense of loneliness, together with the genteel poverty
his inadequate judicial salary compelled, created for Deady a strong
feeling that Portland society and economy were passing him by. He
felt increasingly isolated from the community his friends and he had
dominated politically during territorial years. Portland's postwar pro-
fessional and business leaders respected him; a few even admired him;
but none played Patroclus to his Achilles.
In part to compensate, to insure continued respect if not real affec-
tion, Deady developed and exhibited his unusually strong belief in the
nobility of the common law, its association with the great moral and
political truths extending back to Henry II, and the unique importance
of judges in safeguarding it for their own and future generations. In
some measure to validate his career choice and his life's work, both to
himself and to his readers, Matthew Deady repeatedly chose formal-
ism over fairness in the difficult Portland land claim cases.
view, had been reduced to alliances between "an ignorant proletariat and a vulgar and rapacious
plutocracy." See Mooney, supra note 9, at 599 n.153.
Lawrence Friedman has aptly described such thinking more generally: "For judges of this
stamp, formalism was a protective device. They were middle-of-the-road conservatives, holding
off the vulgar rich on the one hand, the revolutionary masses on the other. The legal tradition
represented balance, sound values, a commitment to orderly process." L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 383-84 (2d ed. 1985); see also A. PAUL, supra note 210, at 233.
214. Deady's early correspondence, especially with James Nesmith, is laced with good-
humored references to corn whiskey and territorial politics. Uncle Ned, the Deady character in
W. ADAMS, supra note 40, carries his whiskey jug everywhere. By 1871, however, he was
attending morning church services in otherwise all-female company and remarking that he had
not touched hard liquor in ten years. E.g., I PHARISEE, supra note 9, at 9, 13, 15, 73.
215. Deady seems to have had an unusually formal relationship with his wife. His diary
entries refer to her constantly as "Mrs. Deady" and note principally her many absences and
indispositions. For a sample of her own aloof literary style, see F. LOCKLEY, CONVERSATIONS
WITH PIONEER WOMEN 81-101 (1981).
Deady's first two sons, Edward and Paul, became lawyers, though after Deady's death Paul
mainly managed his mother's appreciated real property. Edward's recurring alcohol problem
and Paul's lackluster school performance grieved Deady, who nonetheless tried to assist by
appointing them both to various minor court positions like crier. His third son, Henderson,
studied with C.J. Jung and became an early-day analyst, but went East to boarding school when
a teenager and did not return.
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